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INTRODUCTION
T HE Community Reinvestment Act ("CRA") provides, innocu-
ously enough, that federal bank supervisors must assess how a
depository institution (a bank or savings association)2 serves the credit
needs of its "entire community, including low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods," consistent with safe and sound operation.3 The
supervisors must "take such record into account" in evaluating appli-
cations to acquire deposit facilities.4
For many years after its adoption in 1977, the CRA was little more
than a vague statement of principle without much real-world effect.5
In 1989, however, Congress greatly enhanced the CRA's impact as
part of the comprehensive banking legislation of that year.6 Conse-
quently, CRA-based challenges to bank mergers and other transac-
tions subject to CRA scrutiny are now routine, even when the
institution in question has received high marks for CRA compliance
in recent examinations.7 Some deals are actually derailed by the stat-
1 12 U.S.C. §§ 2901-2907 (1988 & Supp. 111 1991).
2 We refer to the firms subject to the CRA as "depository institutions," although certain
firms ordinarily included in the term "depository institutions," notably credit unions, are not
covered.
3 12 U.S.C. § 2903.
4 Id.
5 See Paul H. Schieber, A CRA Guide for Foreign Banks, Am. Banker, Feb. 14, 1992, at 6.
6 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, § 1212, 103 Stat. 183, 526-28 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2902, 2906).
7 See infra Part VI.
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ute,8 and the costs of consummating a transaction in the face of a
CRA challenge can be substantial. 9
The CRA is now controversial. Many bankers object that the stat-
ute imposes burdensome requirements and unfairly disadvantages
depository institutions as compared with their nonbank competitors.
Community activists argue that the CRA is only beginning to address
problems of access to credit in low-income communities. The Bush
Administration submitted a legislative proposal in 1992 designed to
mitigate what it believed were some of the worst effects of the stat-
ute,10 but the legislation failed in Congress. Meanwhile President Bill
Clinton made community reinvestment a centerpiece of his candi-
dacy's economic plan, vowing to "[e]ase the credit crunch in our inner
cities by passing a more progressive Community Reinvestment Act to
prevent redlining, and by requiring financial institutions to invest in
their communities."'"
This Article offers a preliminary economic analysis of the CRA in
its new, post-1989 manifestation. 12 The analysis is preliminary in two
8 See Ellen Braitman, Fed Is Asked to Reconsider Blocking of Merger, Am. Banker, Nov.
25, 1991, at 5.
9 See infra Part V.
10 H.R. 5497, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
11 Bill Clinton & Albert Gore, Putting People First 12 (1992). The President and Vice
President also propose to "[c]reate a nationwide network of community development banks to
provide small loans to low-income entrepreneurs and homeowners in the inner cities. These
banks will also provide advice and assistance to entrepreneurs, invest in affordable housing,
and help mobilize private lenders." Id. at 11. The community development bank proposal
appears to avoid some of the problems that we identify below with the Community
Reinvestment Act. The present Article focuses only on the CRA and its conclusions do not
necessarily carry over to community development banks.
12 There are very few prior articles in the legal literature on the CRA. Orin L. McCluskey,
The Community Reinvestment Act: Is It Doing the Job?, 100 Banking L.J. 33 (1983), focuses
on the legislative history of the act and its effect on redlining. Robert C. Art, Social
Responsibility in Bank Credit Decisions: The Community Reinvestment Act One Decade
Later, 18 Pac. L.J. 1071 (1987), presents a laudatory picture of the act, now dated by the more
recent amendments. Peter D. Schellie, Current Developments with the Community
Reinvestment Act, 42 Bus. Law. 943 (1987), describes strategies available to banks for coping
with CRA protests. Nancy R. Wilsker, The Community Reinvestment Act of 1977: The Saga
Continues .... 46 Bus. Law. 1083 (1991), updates the analysis to 1991. Jonathan P. Tomes,
The "Community" in the Community Reinvestment Act: A Term in Search of a Definition, 10
Ann. Rev. Banking L. 225 (1991) discusses problems in delineating the community that an
institution is required to serve. Marion A. Cowell, Jr. & Monty D. Hagler, The Community
Reinvestment Act in the Decade of Bank Consolidation, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 83 (1992)
present a view of the act from the standpoint of a large bank holding company. A forthcoming
study taking a critical approach to the CRA is Lawrence J. White, The Community
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senses. First, the effects of the 1989 amendments on CRA enforce-
ment have only begun to manifest themselves, so any evaluation of the
amended statute is necessarily provisional and subject to revision in
light of further evidence. Second, our study suggests a number of
important, and potentially testable, predictions about the effects of the
statute-for example, that CRA loans may be less profitable than
other loans. Although we offer what we believe to be persuasive
impressionistic evidence to support our views, statistically controlled
empirical studies could lend further support to our conclusions (or,
alternatively, might tend to disprove them). Thus, this study is also
preliminary in the sense that its findings are subject to modification in
light of future empirical work.
In brief, our conclusions are as follows: We applaud the basic goals
of this legislation. The deterioration of inner-city neighborhoods, and
the numerous problems that accompany it-crime, imprisonment,
drug abuse, teen pregnancy, unemployment, illiteracy, broken fami-
lies, gangs, discrimination, infant mortality, and AIDS-are possibly
the most fundamental domestic issues facing our nation today. No
program would do more good than one that addressed these terrible
problems in a sensible fashion and contributed constructively to their
mitigation. The revitalization of decaying neighborhoods is a funda-
mental challenge for American public life.
We conclude, however, that despite these positive features, the
CRA in its present form does more harm than good.
Reinvestment Act: Good Intentions Headed in the Wrong Direction, 20 Fordham Urb. L.J.
(forthcoming Fall 1992) (manuscript on fie with the Virginia Law Review Association).
In a response to the present Article, Professor Peter Swire proposes a "safe harbor" reform
to the CRA. Peter P. Swire, Safe Harbors and a Proposal to Improve the Community
Reinvestment Act, 79 Va. L. Rev. 349 (1993). Professor Swire's proposal would mitigate some
of the uncertainties that attend the CRA as presently administered, but we believe it does not
address the fundamental problems with the statute. The safe harbor, for example, would not
address the problem of inefficient credit allocation, see infra text accompanying note 64, nor
would it rectify the competitive imbalances that the CRA creates as between different types of
financial institutions, see infra text accompanying notes 76-79. Even more fundamentally, the
safe harbor would not appear to mitigate the perverse incentives that the CRA creates for
capital providers to .avoid the depressed urban neighborhoods that the CRA was ostensibly
designed to serve. See infra text accompanying notes 80-81. Accordingly, although Professor
Swire's proposal would represent a significant improvement over the existing system, it does
not, in our view, represent the sort of fundamental reform that is necessary in order to remedy
the serious deficits of the existing regime.
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The CRA, we find, is premised on a model of credit markets that
was questionable at the time the statute was enacted and that has little
relationship to contemporary realities, and on the normative ground
that credit markets should be local in nature, despite the lack of any
coherent justification for that proposition.
The CRA impairs the safety and soundness of an already over-
strained banking industry: it promotes the concentration of assets in
geographically nondiversified locations, encourages banks to make
unprofitable and risky investment and product-line decisions, and
penalizes banks that seek to reduce costs by consolidating services or
closing or relocating branches. The statute, moreover, imposes a sig-
nificant tax on bank mergers and deters transactions that would
otherwise improve the efficiency and solvency of the nation's banking
system.
The CRA subjects the banking industry to costs and burdens that
are not imposed on lenders otherwise similarly situated, thus placing
depository institutions at a competitive disadvantage compared with
their nonbank competitors. Within the depository institution indus-
try, the CRA discriminates against wholesale banks and other special-
ized institutions that are not well-adapted to community investment
lending.
The CRA imposes significant compliance costs on institutions,
especially smaller institutions. It induces socially unproductive
expenditures on public relations and documentation that provide no
benefit for local communities. Its requirements are vague and self-
contradictory, and its enforcement often appears arbitrary.
The CRA has been turned to purposes that it was not intended to
serve, and for which it was poorly designed. The statute encourages
banks to engage in affirmative action in hiring and credit allocation.
It is administered so as to encourage charitable giving by depository
institutions, especially gifts that fit within certain "politically correct"
categories. Regardless of the social benefits of affirmative action or
charitable giving, these were not the goals of the CRA and its use to
further these goals represents a distortion of its original purpose.
The CRA has become a potent political tool in the hands of activist
political pressure groups. Some of these groups use the statute to
magnify their political importance and to gain special favors for them-
selves and their leaders, either by way of obtaining funding for pet
projects or garnering direct logistical or financial support for their
1993] 295
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operations. It is possible, moreover, that the threat of a CRA chal-
lenge is sometimes used by political leaders for purposes less admira-
ble and more self-serving. This is not to impugn the motives of
activist groups, the great majority of which are reputable and public-
spirited, but merely to suggest that activist groups, like the rest of
society, respond to incentives in order to serve their interests.
Tragically, the CRA poorly furthers the purposes for which it was
designed. It penalizes institutions that actually serve low-income and
moderate-income neighborhoods, while rewarding those that do not.
It drives capital away from poor neighborhoods by imposing a tax on
those depository institutions foolhardy enough to do business in such
communities. It discourages innovation in the provision of financial
services to low-income and moderate-income neighborhoods. It
might even impair the market position of existing institutions that
serve local community needs.
It is not as if there are no alternatives to meet the ostensible goals of
this poorly designed statute. Local organizations can work at the
grass roots level to raise capital and to extend credit to community
members who are known to the organization and whose credit-wor-
thiness can be monitored. Such a process of capital formation can be
driven by a healthy profit motive rather than by the goal of squeezing
as much wealth as possible out of the banking industry. Financial
services such as lifeline checking can be afforded to low-income and
moderate-income consumers by further deregulation in the financial
services industry. And if the goal of the CRA is, or has become, that
of subsidizing poor or disadvantaged citizens, that goal, we believe,
could more adequately be served by direct subsidy programs rather
than by treating depository institutions as some form of public utility
that can be assessed to serve general social needs.
Although our evaluation of the CRA is largely negative, we recog-
nize that, like most regulatory programs, it has benefits as wel as
costs. The CRA does induce depository institutions to return more
credit to their local communities, although why this should be consid-
ered a desideratum of sound banking is unclear to us. The Act
encourages depository institutions to explore market opportunities
that they might have otherwise overlooked, and thus it might offer
marginal efficiency gains in specialized markets. Some of the funds
that are redirected by the CRA do eventually find their way into the
hands of needy persons in the form of better access to credit,
[Vol. 79:291
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improved housing, and the like. We believe, however, that these bene-
fits are small relative to the costs.
If we are correct in our critique of the CRA, why is it so popular?
The answer, we suggest, is that the CRA benefits discrete, well-organ-
ized political interest groups. The principal beneficiaries are commu-
nity activists, who enjoy great power at the local level in many
jurisdictions and who are also influential in Congress. Small busi-
nesses and charitable institutions also profit from the statute. The
federal banking agencies benefit from the CRA because it enhances
their regulatory jurisdictions, and because it offers a powerful threat
that the agencies can use in order to induce cooperation in their pro-
grams. Politicians like the CRA because it allows them to appease
special interest groups through a statutory vehicle that keeps the costs
of such appeasement off the explicit balance sheets of both the banks
and the federal government. This political coalition is powerful
enough to insulate the statute from serious attack, notwithstanding
the costs that the statute imposes on the banking industry, residents of
low-income and moderate-income neighborhoods, and American
taxpayers.
This Article is structured as follows: Part I provides an overview of
the CRA and explores the apparent purposes underlying its enact-
ment and legislative modification. Part II examines the model of
credit markets of the ideology of community reinvestment. Part III
examines the act's impact on different types of institutions, both as
between depository institutions and other lending institutions, and
among different categories of depository institutions. Part IV consid-
ers the implications of the CRA for the safety and soundness of
depository institutions. Part V addresses some of the costs of compli-
ance. Part VI examines how the statute serves the agendas of activist
pressure groups. Part VII illustrates how the CRA has been manipu-
lated by regulators and pressure groups in order to serve goals differ-
ent in some respects from those that motivated the original legislation.
Part VIII evaluates the degree to which the CRA actually serves the
credit needs of low-income and moderate-income communities. Part
IX offers an interest-group analysis of why the CRA appears so politi-
cally popular. Part X deals with some alternatives to the CRA that
may not entail the same costs.
1993]
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I. THE CRA: AN OvERvIEW
We begin with an overview of the statute's legislative history, text,
and administrative enforcement.
A. Legislative History
The CRA had its genesis in allegations during the 1970s that banks
were engaged in "redlining" in the allocation of housing credit in
their communities.13 The concern was that financial institutions
would treat entire geographic areas-particularly decaying urban
zones with significant minority populations-as being off limits for
financing, and reject all applications from those areas without regard
to the credit histories of individual applicants. Redlining was seen by
critics as disproportionately denying credit to racial minorities,14 as
contributing to the deterioration of the affected areas, 15 and as aggra-
vating the problem of financial institutions "dis-investing"-sending
financial resources out of the areas in which the funds were
gathered. 16
Although concern about redlining is a leading theme in the legisla-
tive history,1 7 there is no indication that Congress perceived the pro-
posed legislation as a means of directly prohibiting discrimination in
lending. Indeed, a leading community activist objected to the bill that
formed the basis of the present statute specifically on the ground that
it did not "prohibit discrimination" in the terms and conditions of
credit." Further, Congress did not envision the legislation as requir-
ing affirmative action in lending on the basis of race, sex, ethnic back-
ground, or other categories. Nor did Congress intend the CRA to
induce depository institutions to support local charities or otherwise
subsidize worthy causes. The overwhelming focus of the legislative
history of the CRA was on the need to preserve local communities,
13 See Art, supra note 12, at 1076.
14 See id. at 1077.
15 See id. at 1081.
16 See id. at 1082-83.
17 See, e.g., 123 Cong. Rec. 17,604 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) (CRA "is intended
to eliminate the practice of redlining by lending institutions.").
Is See Community Credit Needs: Hearings on S.406 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing, and Urban Affairs, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1977) [hereinafter Community Credit
Needs] (statement of Gale Cincotta, Chairperson, National People's Action).
298 [Vol. 79:291
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and on the argument that depository institutions could invest in their
local communities and still make a profit.19
Moreover, despite the emphasis on redlining in the legislative his-
tory, the statute passed by Congress was phrased broadly to encom-
pass depository institutions throughout the country, including
institutions in suburban, rural, and wealthy urban areas as well as
institutions serving decaying inner-city neighborhoods. As the title of
the statute indicates, the focus of the legislation was on the problem of
depository institutions shipping funds outside the areas in which the
funds were obtained. The emphasis was on communities, not on race,
ethnicity, gender, or other categories that dominate public policy
debates in the 1990s. 20
B. Text and Administrative Enforcement
We turn now to the statute itself and its administrative interpreta-
tion. As we have noted, the CRA requires insured depository institu-
tions to make efforts to meet the credit needs of their "entire
communit[ies]," including low-income and moderate-income neigh-
19 See, e.g., 123 Cong. Rec. 17,631 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire) ("This bill would
encourage the agencies to be somewhat more vigorous in reminding lenders of their local
responsibilities."); id. at 17,633 (statement of Sen. Sarbanes) ("There is nothing in this
legislation that is going to require any lending institution to take any risks that are inconsistent
with or contrary to the safe and sound operation of the institution.").
20 Legislators both for and against the proposed statute agreed that the bill was aimed at
bolstering decaying communities. See, e.g., id. at 17,628 (statement of Sen. Morgan) (attacking
the CRA on the ground that it might require an institution "to make an unsound loan in a
specific location in order to meet its quota of loans in a given locality"); id. at 17,633
(statement of Sen. Sarbanes) (asking rhetorically, in support of the proposal, "[w]hy should not
a banking institution have a responsibility to meet the credit needs of the local communities in
which they are located").
This is not to say that concerns about race, ethnicity, or gender may not have been present
in the minds of some members of Congress during the deliberations on the legislation. Such
concerns, however, appear hardly at all in the written record, and appear at most as a subtext
in the statements of certain legislators. Senator Proxmire, for example, attempted to discredit
the Federal Reserve's opposition to the proposal by noting that the federal banking agencies
had been unwilling to vigorously enforce the laws prohibiting discrimination in lending, and
that their opposition to the CRA was "in character." Id. at 17,631 (statement of Sen.
Proxmire). Senator Garn, in opposing the proposal, suggested that the CRA would duplicate
efforts under the Equal Credit Opportunity Act. Id at 17,634 (statement of Senator Garn).
The legislative history, however, does not contain any persuasive indication that Congress
viewed the CRA as an affirmative action measure as opposed to what the bill purported to be
on its face, namely a measure designed to encourage reinvestment in local communities.
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borhoods.21 A critical issue is the meaning of the "community" that a
depository institution is supposed to serve.22 The Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, an umbrella organization of federal
bank regulators, states that "[t]he term 'local community' refers to
the contiguous area surrounding each office or group of offices of an
institution. ' 23 The delineation of the community is left, in the first
instance, up to the depository institution itself, although an institution
may not unreasonably exclude low-income and moderate-income
areas from its community.
24
Depository institutions are not automatically sanctioned for failing
to satisfy their CRA obligations. Rather, because most significant
forms of bank expansion require applications subject to CRA scru-
tiny, the Act represents a meaningful threat that the responsible fed-
eral agency will deny a bank's application to expand.2 5  Thus, any
bank that contemplates establishing new branches, acquiring other
banks, or merging into or being acquired by another bank must con-
sider the possibility that its business plan will be stymied by an
adverse CRA finding.
26
As long as CRA examination and enforcement remained confiden-
tial, the danger of an application being denied on CRA grounds was
small. Congress, however, enhanced the effect of the statute in 198927
21 12 U.S.C. § 2903.
22 See Tomes, supra note 12, at 225.
23 Community Reinvestment: Agencies Issue Q & A on Key Factors Involved in
Compliance with CRA, Banking Pol'y Rep., June 1, 1992, at 9, 9 (reprinting the Federal
Financial Institutions Examination Council's answers to the 31 "'most commonly asked'"
questions about the CRA).
24 Id.
25 12 U.S.C. § 2903. An application to acquire a depository facility includes applications
for (1) national bank or thrift institution charters; (2) deposit insurance in connection with a
newly chartered depository institution; (3) the establishment of a domestic branch; (4) the
relocation of a home or branch office; (5) merger or consolidation with, or the acquisition of
the assets of, or the assumption of the liabilities of a depository institution; and (6) the
acquisition of shares in a depository institution requiring approval under the federal Bank
Holding Company Act or Savings Association Holding Company Act. Id. § 2902(3).
26 The CRA does not by its terms apply to acquisitions by bank holding companies of
nonbanking firms under § 4(c)(8) of the Bank Holding Company Act, see The Mitsui Bank,
Ltd., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 381 (1990) (Order Approving Acquisition of Nonbank Company), but
acquisitions of depository institutions, including savings institutions, are subject to CRA
scrutiny, see Norwest Corp., 76 Fed. Res. Bull. 873 (1990) (Order Approving the Acquisition
of a Savings Association and Formation of a Bank Holding Company).
27 Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-
73, see. 1212, § 807, 103 Stat. 183, 527-28. The CRA provisions were part of a floor
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by requiring the examining agency to prepare a public, written evalua-
tion of the applicant's CRA performance.28 This evaluation must
state the agency's conclusions regarding each of twelve assessment
factors, 29 discuss the facts supporting such conclusions, 30 and contain
the institution's overall CRA rating, as well as a statement describing
the basis for the rating.31 The 1989 amendments also established a
system of four CRA ratings-"outstanding," "satisfactory," "needs
to improve," and "substantial noncompliance"-to replace the prior
five-tiered numerical rating scale.32 Most importantly, the amend-
ments for the first time required that the CRA ratings, and much of
the examining agency's supporting discussion, be made public as of
July 1, 1990. 33 By requiring the publication of ratings, the amend-
ments subjected the supervisory agencies to political pressure from
groups claiming that the agencies were not doing enough to ensure
CRA compliance. The publication of an adverse CRA rating also
greatly increased the chance that the institution involved would face a
CRA challenge in the future (though a satisfactory rating, as we will
see, is no guarantee that such a protest can be avoided).34
The 1989 amendments changed the political dynamics of the CRA.
Agencies apparently began to enforce the CRA more strictly.35 The
agencies have been willing to give the two lowest ratings of "needs to
improve" and "substantial noncompliance" to a sizeable proportion
of the depository institutions examined-approximately ten percent
by a recent count.3 6 This represents a significant toughening of stan-
dards; before 1989, more than ninety-seven percent of depository
amendment in the House, which had been rejected in the House Banking Committee. See 135
Cong. Rec. H2758-59 (daily ed. June 15, 1989). The amendment passed by 14 votes in the
House and was then adopted, with amendments, by the House-Senate Conference Committee.
28 12 U.S.C. § 2906(a)(1).
29 Id. § 2906(b)(1)(A). The assessment factors are published in the regulations of the
Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council. See infra note 123.
30 12 U.S.C. § 2906(b)(1)(B).
31 Id. § 2906(b)(1)(C).
32 Id. § 2906(b)(2).
33 Id. Certain information deemed to intrude on the privacy of named individuals or to be
unsuitable for disclosure can be excised from the public section of the report. Id. § 2906(c).
34 See infra notes 160-65 and accompanying text.
35 See 135 Cong. Rec. H2753 (daily ed. June 15, 1989) (statement of Rep. Kennedy).
36 See A "Better than Satisfactory" Grade?, Am. Banker, June 15, 1992, at 10.
1993]
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institutions received one of the two highest CRA ratings.3 7 The 1989
amendments have unquestionably put teeth into the CRA.
Data on CRA compliance in the wake of the 1989 amendments are
still incomplete, but preliminary conclusions are possible. We have
some breakdown on the relative frequency of the four CRA rating
categories: The overwhelming majority of institutions-about eighty
percent-receive "satisfactory" ratings; about ten percent receive
"outstanding" ratings; about nine percent receive "needs to improve;"
and about one percent receive "substantial noncompliance. ' 38 As a
practical matter, an institution in the "substantial noncompliance"
category can assume that the banking agencies will look with disfavor
at any application, even the most routine, for a depository facility.
3 9
Most dramatic is the relationship between CRA compliance and
institutional size. Simply put, the larger the institution, the greater
the compliance. Ironically, it is the large banks-not the so-called
"community" banks-that have most significantly increased the serv-
ices they offer to low-income and moderate-income customers. An
American Bankers Association study found that no-frills checking
accounts for low-income customers were available at eighty-five per-
cent of banks with over one billion dollars in assets in 1991, as com-
pared with an industry average of only sixty-one percent. 40 The size
effect is pronounced for CRA ratings as well. A recent study by the
Community Reinvestment Institute of San Francisco found that the
average size of banks receiving the highest CRA rating was $17.6 bil-
lion in assets.41 Banks with the second-highest rating had average
assets of $4 billion, banks with the third-highest rating had average
37 For example, the FDIC in 1988 gave a composite CRA rating of "4" or "5" to only 12 of
the 3060 rated institutions, or .4% of the institutions rated, and gave a rating of "3" to only 58,
or 1.9% of the rated institutions. The FDIC gave a "2" rating to 2683 or 87.7% of the rated
firms, and gave its highest rating of "1" to 307 or 10% of the rated institutions. See
Discrimination in Home Mortgage Lending: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and
Regulatory Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st
Cong., 1st Sess. 53 (1989).
38 A "Better Than Satisfactory" Grade?, supra note 36, at 10.
39 Some have argued for a return to a five-tiered scale based on a perception that the current
scale leaves too many institutions with a "satisfactory" rating and fails to recoguize those
banks doing a better-than-satisfactory job. Id. So far no action has been taken. Id.
40 ABA Study Shows Increasing Focus on Low-Income Consumers, Bank Letter, Aug. 12,
1991 (available in LEXIS, Banks Library, IINews File).
41 When Bigger is Better, U.S. Banker, July 1991, at 8.
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assets of $532 million, and banks with the fourth, and lowest, CRA
rating had average assets of only $55 million.4 2
This size effect reflects the CRA's enforcement regime. Large insti-
tutions-particularly those that wish to expand-have more to gain
from a favorable CRA rating, and more to lose from an unfavorable
one, than do small institutions. A large institution is more likely to
apply for a new depository facility than a small one, and it is only
when applying for a depository facility that the CRA is likely to have
real bite, because the agencies' principal enforcement tool is the power
to deny applications. Moreover, a large institution is more vulnerable
to CRA challenges by pressure groups; as in most industries, there are
economies of scale in protesting, and groups specializing in CRA pro-
tests recognize that they can obtain a greater return for their efforts by
protesting against larger institutions, even if smaller institutions actu-
ally have "worse" records of CRA compliance.
II. THE OUTDATED IDEOLOGY OF COMMUNITY REINVESTMENT
The CRA is grounded in an ideology of localism in banking that
traces back at least to the Progressive Movement of the early decades
of the twentieth century. In the CRA, this ideology was turned
against the banking industry by embodying, in legal form, the propo-
sition that depository institutions owe special obligations to their local
communities.
The basic principle of localism, as the Supreme Court once
observed, is that "both as a matter of history and as a matter of pres-
ent commercial reality, banking and related financial activities are of
profound local concern.14 3 Underlying the principle of localism are
several related propositions, each of which was stressed in one form or
another in the congressional debates on the act. Although these pro-
positions may have had some validity earlier in our history, and may
even have retained some force at the time the CRA was enacted, they
bear little relationship to contemporary banking realities. Localism
42 Id.
43 Lewis v. BT Investment Managers, 447 U.S. 27, 38 (1980); see also Northeast Bancorp v.
Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159, 177 (1985) (It is a "historical fact
that our country traditionally has favored widely dispersed control of banking. While many
other western nations are dominated by a handful of centralized banks, we have some 15,000
commercial banks attached to a greater or lesser degree to the communities in which they are
located.")
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has a nostalgic ring in American folklore, but it no longer character-
izes the American banking industry-especially not the larger firms
that have been the principal targets of CRA scrutiny. The underlying
propositions are these: (1) banking is a local industry, (2) banks drain
credit out of local communities, and (3) banks owe special duties to
their local communities.
A. Banking Is a Local Industry
A basic theme underlying the ideology of the CRA is the proposi-
tion that banks are fundamentally local institutions: they take depos-
its from the local community and return those funds to the
community in the form of loans. Alternatively, the proposition is that
banks should be local institutions, even if they sometimes behave as if
they are not.
Proponents of the CRA adverted to this theme in debates on the
statute, arguing that the bill was necessary to correct for a disturbing
trend away from localism. As Senator Proxmire, the principal spon-
sor of the CRA, remarked, "We need to encourage bankers to get out
of the office and walk around the block and find loan opportunities
here at home. The law already provides that banks are chartered to
meet the convenience and needs of their communities.
[U]nfortunately many bankers and many bank regulators have forgot-
ten the meaning of those words."'
The rhetoric linking banks with their local communities has deep
roots in the American imagination. The banker in American folklore
is a familiar local figure, usually a pillar of the community, sometimes
a villain, but always a creature of his immediate environment. The
local orientation of the depository institution is even more pro-
nounced in the case of thrift institutions, which specialize in con-
sumer and home mortgage rather than commercial loans. One need
only recall the magnetic force that Bedford Falls exercised over build-
ing and loan president George Bailey in Frank Capra's It's a Wonder-
ful Life45 in order to appreciate the extent to which depository
institutions, especially thrift institutions, were associated with their
local communities in twentieth-century American imagination.
44 123 Cong. Rec. 17,630 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
45 It's a Wonderful Life (RKO Radio Pictures, Inc. 1946).
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This popular image of banks as fundamentally local institutions
had substantial grounding in reality earlier in the century. Banks
then were local by necessity. Transportation and communications
technology had not advanced to the point where it was feasible for
individuals or firms to conduct their checking operations at a dis-
tance, and the only practical source of credit for most individuals and
firms was a local banker. These technological constraints were rein-
forced, at a time when they may have just begun to break down, by
legal prohibitions against geographic bank expansion. In the early
decades of the century, most states adopted unit banking rules that
effectively enforced the principle of localism by prohibiting a banking
institution from doing business out of more than one office.46 The
result was a decentralized banking system characterized by many
thousands of smaller institutions-in contrast with the centralized
systems with nationwide branching that developed in other industrial-
ized nations.4 7
In recent years, however, banking has become far less local in
scope. The proponents of the CRA recognized this when they decried
the bankers' tendency to turn away from local communities. Senator
Proxmire and others were far off the mark, however, when they por-
trayed the problem as simply one of bankers, abetted by indulgent
regulators, forgetting their obligations to local communities and los-
ing sight of the profit opportunities in their own back yards. This
view was unrealistic even in 1977. The erosion of localism was not a
matter of bankers' collective moral lapse in failing to serve their home
towns; it was a product of forces over which bankers had little control
and that, on balance, have served the overall economic welfare of the
American people.
The evolution of the American banking system from one composed
of localized unit banks to one characterized by geographically dis-
persed, larger institutions has taken place on a number of fronts.48
Virtually all states now permit branch banking, and many allow state-
46 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Banking Law and Regulation 12-15 (1992).
47 See id. at 14-15.
48 See generally Geoffrey P. Miller, Legal Restrictions on Bank Consolidation: An
Economic Analysis, 77 Iowa L. Rev. 1083 (1992) (presenting "the pros and cons of banking
consolidation in light of recent economic research" and concluding that "the case for
dismantling the remaining geographic restraints on bank expansion is clear-cut," id. at 1086).
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wide branching.4 9 New York has gone farther and permitted inter-
state branching on a reciprocal basis with other states50 Equally dra-
matic has been the growth of geographically dispersed banking
through bank holding companies. Starting early in the century, bank-
ing institutions have expanded within the borders of a state by means
of holding companies owning multiple subsidiary banks."1 More
recently, the holding company form has allowed geographic expan-
sion across state lines. The Supreme Court upheld regional interstate
banking compacts in 1985,52 thereby stimulating a massive and con-
tinuing trend toward interstate banking. Today nearly all states per-
mit interstate bank acquisitions. 3 Many significant interstate mergers
have been consummated,54 and more are sure to occur soon. Because
the large majority of banking assets are today held by banks that
themselves are part of holding companies, the raw number of banks in
the country, which remains quite large (about twelve thousand by a
recent count),55 greatly overstates the actual degree of localism in the
banking industry today.
Improvements in information processing and communication tech-
nology have facilitated bank expansion by other means as well. Many
customers utilize bank-by-mail services, which frees them from the
need to be physically near to their depository institution. Paychecks
can be deposited automatically in banks located anywhere in the
country through automated clearing house transactions.56 Automatic
teller machines permit withdrawals of cash, as well as other transac-
tions, at thousands of locations. For many consumers, a trip to the
bank has become a rare event. Indeed, increasing numbers of con-
sumers are opting out of the banking system altogether, relying
instead on money market funds and credit cards to perform their
transaction services.57
49 See Macey & Miller, supra note 46, at 32.
5o New York Governor Signs Branching Bill, Am. Banker, June 30, 1992, at 15.
51 See Macey & Miller, supra note 46, at 19-20, 26-28.
52 Northeast Bancorp, Inc. v. Board of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., 472 U.S. 159
(1985); see Geoffrey P. Miller, Interstate Banking in the Court, 1985 Sup. Ct. Rev. 179 (1985).
53 A Look at Laws Granting Interstate Powers to Banks, Am. Banker, Mar. 20, 1992, at 8.
54 Top 300 Banks in Deposits and Assets, Am. Banker, Mar. 26, 1992, at 28A.
55 Economic Report of the President 160 (Feb. 1991).
56 See Edward L. Rubin & Robert Cooter, The Payment System: Cases, Materials and
Issues 736-39 (1989).
57 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Nondeposit Deposits and the Future of
Bank Regulation, 91 Mich. L. Rev. 237 (1992).
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These changes suggest that banking today is much less of a local
industry than it was in the past. Nevertheless, the CRA might be
defended on the normative ground that, regardless of whether bank-
ing is a local industry today, it should be a local industry. Yet it is
difficult to justify a normative preference for localism in banking mar-
kets under any coherent conception of public policy. The movement
away from localism described above has been generally beneficial for
consumers. It has improved banking service, enhanced asset diversifi-
cation, and allowed banks to take advantage of economies of scale.58
At the same time, it has seriously weakened, although not entirely
broken, the ties that connect banks with their immediate local
communities. 9
Thus, the principle that banking is essentially a local industry is no
longer generally valid as an empirical matter, nor can the proposition
that banks should be local, even if they are not, be defended on per-
suasive normative terms.
B. Banks Drain Credit Out of Local Communities
Banks have long faced the charge that they divert funds obtained
from local depositors to borrowers elsewhere, thereby hampering eco-
nomic development in the localities from which the deposits are
obtained.' Senator Proxmire voiced these concerns: "Unfortunately,
we find many banks and many savings and loan [sic] which take
money from the community and reinvest it elsewhere, in some cases
abroad, in some cases in other parts of the country.... We have
found many cases where these institutions have invested virtually
nothing in the local community.'
61
58 See Miller, supra note 48, at 1096-121.
59 This is not to say that location is unimportant, especially for small consumer
transactions. A recent Federal Reserve Board survey found, for example, that the large
majority of individuals continue to utilize the services of a bank in their local community for
checking account services. See Gregory E. Elliehausen & John D. Wolken, Banking Markets
and the Use of Financial Services by Households, 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 169 (1992).
60 As we note in other work, the charge that financial institutions improperly divert funds
from local communities was a significant part of Progressive ideology in the early part of the
century, and was an important element in the campaign to enact state securities legislation.
Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Origin of the Blue Sky Laws, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 347
(1991).
61 123 Cong. Rec. 17,603 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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Senator Proxmire and other advocates of the CRA were correct
that local banks often did not lend a substantial proportion of their
assets within their communities. In fact, local banks have directed
funds elsewhere for many years, either by means of correspondent
deposits at city banks, investments in loan participations or purchases
of loans originated elsewhere, purchases of bonds issued by distant
firms or government entities, or otherwise. 62 The phenomenon about
which the CRA advocates were complaining was nothing new.
Despite the CRA advocates' accurate assessment of this situation,
the argument for mandatory community reinvestment falls short for a
number of reasons, some going to the weaknesses of reinvestment
arguments generally, and some peculiar to the CRA.
First, proponents of community reinvestment have never satisfacto-
rily explained why the mere fact that funds are obtained from a par-
ticular locality ipso facto implies that these funds should be returned
to the same locality. We would never insist that corn grown in Iowa
farm country be returned to Iowa farms. The corn is shipped from
the farms, where it is in surplus, to other areas where there is a deficit.
It is not clear why credit should be different. Like corn or any other
commodity, credit is allocated through a price system that directs the
good to the user who values it the most. In the case of credit, the
price is the terms that the banker can obtain on loans; and if the
banker can earn better terms outside the local community than
within, it is difficult to see why the law should deter the transfer of the
credit to the higher valued user. Moreover, the export of credit, like
the export of grain or other commodities, provides benefits to the
locality in which the credit is generated, in the form of local banks
that can pay higher interest rates for deposits as a result of their abil-
ity to make profitable loans in distant locations. Just as Iowa farmers
would be worse off if they were allowed to sell grain only to local
residents, so bank depositors in a local community will be worse off if
banks are restricted in their ability to export those funds to areas of
capital shortage.
Community reinvestment advocates respond that profitable loans
are available nearby if the banker would but look. This argument,
62 On the use of correspondent banks as a means of allocating credit across wide geographic
areas, see Eugene N. White, The Regulation and Reform of the American Banking System,
1900-1929, at 65-74 (1983). On bank purchases of bonds, see Macey & Miller, supra note 60,
at 374-76.
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however, fails to explain why, if there are good profit opportunities
available locally and readily identifiable at low cost, the local deposi-
tory institutions are not exploiting them. Who better, after all, to
identify a sound local loan customer than the local banker, with the
superior access to information that experience in the local community
provides? Attempting to explain this conundrum, Senator Proxmire
admitted that bankers "have much better judgment because they
understand their community, and have much better judgment than we
have here [in Congress]," but then, with breathtaking mogic, asserted
that, nevertheless, "we have to do something to nudge them, influence
them, persuade them to invest in their [local] community."63
If local banks do not invest locally because the most profitable loan
opportunities are elsewhere, then mandatory reinvestment rules are
nothing other than governmentally-imposed credit allocation that
impairs the efficiency of the economy by directing credit to lower-
value uses. Senator Proxmire denied that the Act would allocate
credit, and noted that "[w]e already have credit allocation... and it is
credit allocation for the Fortune Five Hundred. Whenever money
gets tight, it is small business and housing and family farms that suf-
fer, and big business that gets the scarce credit.""M Although this
rhetoric has an appealing populist ring, it overlooks the fact that the
credit "allocation" to big business is the result of the operation of the
price system, whereas the allocation under a mandatory community
reinvestment rule is allocation by government fiat.
Quite apart from the general problem of credit allocation, there are
additional lapses of logic in the argument for the CRA in particular.
The CRA is a general measure, applying across the board to make it
less attractive for banks and savings associations to drain credit out of
their local communities. Yet, if one bank drains credit out of its local
community, it is very likely to supply that credit to a borrower in
some other local community. Credit is fungible: It is not as if the
borrower particularly cares whether the money comes from local
depositors or distant ones. Accordingly, aside from foreign loans
(which were frequently criticized by CRA proponents) 65 it is difficult
to see why communities in general suffer a net harm when funds are
63 See 123 Cong. Rec. 17,603 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
64 Community Credit Needs, supra note 18, at 2.
65 See 123 Cong. Rec. 17,630 (1977) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
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transferred between them (although some local communities may be
net importers of credit and others net exporters).
C. Banks Owe Special Duties to Their Local Communities
A third major theme underlying the doctrine of localism is the
notion that banks owe special duties to their local communities. That
is, because they have been vested with valuable privileges by their
communities, they have an obligation to return some of the resulting
benefits in the form of credit to their localities.
This theme appears frequently in the legislative history of the
CRA,6 6 and indeed finds expression in the text of the statute itself.
The CRA begins with the recitation that "regulated financial institu-
tions are required by law to demonstrate that their deposit facilities
serve the convenience and needs of the communities in which they are
chartered to do business,"67 and that "regulated financial institutions
have [a] continuing and affinative obligation to help meet the credit
needs of the local communities in which they are chartered."6 The
clear implication is that the privilege of obtaining a bank charter car-
ries with it responsibilities, and that one of the chief such responsibili-
ties is the obligation to return credit to the community from which
deposits are taken.
Congress is, of course, free to declare that the privilege of con-
ducting a banking business carries with it the obligation to return
credit to local communities. Congressional fiat aside, however, the
argument that banks enjoy a special privilege that carries with it
exceptional responsibilities to local communities, whatever its validity
in 1977, is now questionable at best. Banks and savings associations
no longer enjoy the effective monopoly in the deposit franchise that
they did in 1977. At that time banks and saving and loans operated
under a system of below-market prices for deposits-no interest for
checking accounts and an administrative ceiling for time and savings
accounts, with savings and loans allowed to pay a little more than
banks-that can aptly be described as a cartel, administered and
enforced by the federal government for the benefit of depository insti-
66 Id. at 17,603-04, 17,629-33; see McCluskey, supra note 12, at 37 & n.19.
67 12 U.S.C. § 2901(a)(1).
68 Id. § 2901(a)(3).
[Vol. 79:291
HeinOnline -- 79 Va. L. Rev.  310 1993
Community Reinvestment Act
tutions.6 9 That regulatory cartel has now completely broken down as
banks and thrifts compete vigorously with one another for deposits.70
As a result depository institutions have lost an enormously important
government benefit that they enjoyed at the time the CRA was
enacted.
Moreover, depository institutions are now facing intense and grow-
ing competition from other types of firms for the transaction business
of wholesale and retail customers. 71  The most significant of these
nonbank competitors are mutual funds, many of which today offer
extensive checking privileges. Other firms-even industrial corpora-
tions-are offering services that perform most of the same functions
as the checking account at a bank.72 With the erosion of the monop-
oly that their charter once provided over transaction accounts, the
argument that depository institutions should be required to return to
their communities a portion of the profits flowing from their monop-
oly franchise loses much of its force.
Furthermore, it is not entirely clear, in the current banking envi-
ronment, that a charter to operate as a depository institution confers
significant benefits, even when federal deposit insurance is added to
the picture. The costs of FDIC premiums have increased seven-fold
over the past few years, to the point where insurance assessments con-
stitute a significant drag on depository institution earnings.73 At the
same time, other regulatory taxes-including, importantly, the costs
of the CRA itself-have been imposed on insured depository institu-
tions.7 4 As a result, a significant class of institutions might well make
themselves better off by opting out of federal deposit insurance 75 or by
dropping their bank charter altogether. Thus, the argument that
69 See Geoffrey P. Miller, The Future of the Dual Banking System, 53 Brook. L. Rev. 1, 2-4
(1987); Kenneth E. Scott, The Uncertain Course of Bank Deregulation, Reg., May/June 1981,
at 40.
70 See Miller, supra note 69, at 4-7.
71 Macey & Miller, supra note 57, at 245-64.
72 See id. at 260-62 (describing program of IBM credit corporation that effectively offers
checking account services to investors).
73 See Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward Enhanced Consumer Choice in
Banking: Uninsured Deposit Facilities as Financial Intermediaries for the 1990's, 1991 Ann.
Surv. Am. L. 865.
74 For a description of the greatly strengthened enforcement regime now applicable to
depository institutions, officers, and institution-affiliated parties, see Macey & Miller, supra
note 46, at 573-625.
75 See Macey & Miller, supra note 73, at 884-96.
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depository institutions enjoy a special and valuable privilege that enti-
tles the chartering authority to demand some kind of return in kind
has far less credibility today than it did in 1977.
In short, the ideology of community reinvestment on which the
CRA was premised was questionable at the time the statute was
enacted and bears little resemblance to contemporary marketplace
realities. Although the CRA might be justified on other grounds, it
can no longer be supported by its original ideological foundations.
III. DIFFERENTIAL IMPACT ON DEPOSITORY INSTITUTIONS
An increasingly serious difficulty with the CRA is the fact that it
burdens certain types of institutions while favoring others-thus
impairing the safety and soundness of those that suffer disproportion-
ately under the act. The CRA has two main differential effects. First,
it applies only to depository institutions-banks and savings associa-
tions-and not to other types of lenders. Second, it discriminates
within the category of depository institutions by placing greatly dis-
proportionate burdens on some institutions and thus giving an artifi-
cial competitive advantage to others.
A. Depository Institutions vs. Other Lenders
Banks and savings associations face competition from a host of
other businesses with respect to their lending activities, including pen-
sion funds, life insurance companies, consumer finance firms, mort-
gage banks, credit unions, and many other firms. The CRA thus
effectively imposes a special, discriminatory tax on banks and savings
associations, which are thereby weakened relative to other financial
institutions. This weakening process is already well underway, not
only because of the CRA, but also for a variety of other reasons.76 In
the long run, the relative decline of banks may not be an irrevocable
blow to our financial system: as banks decline, other institutions will
take their place, and eventually the system will move toward equilib-
rium. Nevertheless, the social costs of the CRA and other regulatory
taxes now being imposed on depository institutions are substantial,
76 For discussion, see Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failure: The
Politicization of a Social Problem, 45 Stan. L. Rev. 289, 290-98 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey &
Geoffrey P. Miller, America's Banking System: The Origins and Future of the Current Crisis,
69 Wash. U. L.Q. 769 (1991) [hereinafter Macey & Miller, America's Banking System].
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because the assets tied up in these firms are reduced significantly in
value when they are placed at an artificial competitive disadvantage as
compared with other financial institutions.
Of course, the problem of differential impact might be solved by
extending the CRA to cover other lenders. 7 Even putting to one side
the economic costs of extending the reach of an inefficient statute,
however, it does not seem feasible, given the existing conceptual frame
of the CRA, to apply it to many nonbank lenders. Depository institu-
tions other than banks and savings associations tend to operate across
extended geographic areas. 71 They do not serve any particular "com-
munity." These lenders could be brought within the ambit of the reg-
ulation only if the ideology of community were dropped or extensively
modified-to be replaced, for example, by the idea that racial minori-
ties, women, or other groups represent "communities" that are not
geographically localized, and that lending institutions of all sorts owe
a duty to take affirmative steps to serve the needs of these distinct
communities within the overall society. Such a statute is not impossi-
ble to imagine, although legislation of this sort appears unlikely to be
enacted any time soon.79 For the foreseeable future, it appears that
banks and savings associations will continue to suffer the discrimina-
tory tax of the CRA. This tax, coupled with other factors, will con-
tribute further to the decline of these institutions within the American
financial system.
B. Differential Impact Among Depository Institutions
In addition to imposing differentially high costs on banks and sav-
ings associations, the CRA also creates distortions within the banking
77 Some community activists at least would favor this approach. See Robert C. Art, supra
note 12, at 1137 n.288 (quoting a member of ACORN, the leading CRA activist organization,
warning that "'[i]t's just a matter of time'" before nonbank lenders are covered by the
statute). The banking industry also favors extending CRA to nonbank lenders. See
Government Check Cashing, "Lifeline" Checking, and the Community Reinvestment Act:
Hearings on S. 906, S. 907, and S. 909 Before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory
Affairs of the Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
99 (1989) (testimony of the American Bankers Association).
78 See supra text accompanying notes 48-59.
79 It is possible, however, that credit unions will be included in the statute, since, like banks
and savings associations, these are federally-insured (usually) depository institutions. The
CRA is unlikely to have much force as applied to credit unions, however, because the practice
of these institutions of making loans to their own members would likely be deemed sufficient
"reinvestment" to comply with the strictures of the statute.
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industry because it has different effects on varying types of depository
institutions. This differential effect manifests itself in a variety of
ways.
Institutions Serving Depressed Communities. A particularly troub-
ling effect of the Act is its discrimination against depository institu-
tions serving poor neighborhoods. Because a bank's CRA rating is
based on its lending practices in the area contiguous to its offices, the
CRA imposes greater costs on banks in poor areas than those in
wealthy areas to the extent that it causes banks to lend funds locally. 0
Banks located in wealthy areas can elect not to make loans in poor
areas without risking serious CRA challenge. Banks located in poor
areas, on the other hand, are effectively forced to devote a substantial
proportion of their loan portfolios to their local communities.
Because of these additional regulatory requirements and costs, banks
seeking to expand will be less likely to establish new branches or
offices in poor areas than they were prior to the promulgation of the
CRA.
That the CRA would have the effect of reducing the availability of
credit in impoverished areas was well understood at the time the stat-
ute was enacted. Robert R. Barnett, the Chairman of the FDIC,
objected to the legislation on exactly these grounds at that time. He
wrote, persuasively if inelegantly, that
the practical effect of the bill could be to discourage financial institu-
tions from making applications for offices in neighborhoods where
funds are badly needed because of the reexamination that this would
entail with respect to their lending policies in service areas where they
already have offices. Some institutions might even close down offices
already established in certain neighborhoods if they felt that they
could be publicly criticized for not meeting the credit needs of such
neighborhoods when they apply for a branch in another location.
The result of this would be to increase the present concentration of
financial institution offices in more affluent neighborhoods.81
80 This analysis assumes that it costs more to make loans in poor areas than in wealthy
areas. Of course it may be the case that the higher costs of making loans in poor areas (which
come in the form of higher rates of default and delayed collection) can be offset by charging
higher interest rates-but then the institution in question would likely forfeit the CRA credit
for making the loan in the first place.
81 Letter from Robert E. Barnett, Chairman, FDIC, to Senator William Proxmire (May 4,
1977), reprinted in Community Credit Needs, supra note 18, at 15-17.
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If this counsel had been heeded in 1977, impoverished urban areas
might now have better access to credit than they do with the CRA in
place.
Banks Trying to Expand or Otherwise Reposition Themselves in the
Market. In addition to discriminating against depository institutions
serving poor neighborhoods, the CRA provides stable, well-estab-
lished banks with advantages over banks that are trying to reposition
themselves in the market. Although all banks are equally subject to
some of the consequences of a low CRA rating, such as unfavorable
media coverage, the most direct effects are on those institutions that
are trying to expand by merging or establishing new branches or that
are attempting to cut costs through such activities as consolidating
services and closing or relocating branches.
The CRA also penalizes banks that attempt to improve their opera-
tions in a way that might be challenged by local politicians or commu-
nity activists as detrimental to low-income or minority groups. 8 2 For
example, when Ameritrust sought approval to consolidate several
branch offices in Cleveland in order to cut costs, its application was
greeted with a storm of political protest. The Mayor of the city lam-
basted the bank for its "appalling community reinvestment perform-
ance" and joined community activists and members of the city council
in resisting the bank's plans.8 3 These protests occurred despite the
fact that the bank had received, the previous month, the second-high-
est CRA rating from the Comptroller of the Currency.84
Wholesale Banks. The CRA is particularly inappropriate as
applied to wholesale banks. These banks have elected to serve the
82 The federal supervisory agencies implicitly discourage branch closings by indicating that
an institution will receive CRA points for adopting "a written corporate policy concerning
branch closings which contains provisions for appropriate notice, analysis of the impact of the
closing on the local community, and efforts that may be made to minimize any adverse
effects." Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the Community
Reinvestment Act, 54 Fed. Reg. 13,742, 13,744 (1989). Moreover, the 1991 amendments to
the CRA indicate, at least by indirection, that a depository institution will lose CRA credit if it
closes or relocates a branch in a depressed area unless it pays a suitable exit fee. With its most
recent amendment, the revised CRA statute now provides that an institution will earn CRA
credit if it subsidizes a minority or women's bank upon closing a branch in a minority area, 12
U.S.C. § 2907; the implication is rather clear that the institution will lose CRA points if it
closes a branch and fails to provide the subsidy.
83 See Ellen Braitman, Ameritrust's Branch Shutdowns Delayed by Charges of Redlining,
Am. Banker, Aug. 27, 1991, at 1.
84 Id. at 5.
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wholesale market-the market for large corporate loans and depos-
its-and typically carry on only a small retail banking operation,
often for the convenience of wholesale customers. Although whole-
sale banks have to be located somewhere, and in this sense are within
a community, they are not closely tied to their local communities.
This is not because of any nefarious motives, but is simply a function
of business strategy: because of the nature of its business, a wholesale
bank draws a substantial amount of funding, and makes a substantial
amount of loans, away from its local community.
Regrettably, such banks are treated, under the CRA, without much
regard to their specialized business activities.85 The Federal Reserve
Board has refused to exempt wholesale banks from the statute, con-
cluding that the Act was "intended to cover all banks that are in the
business of extending credit to the public, including both wholesale
and retail banks." 6 The Board's reasoning for sweeping wholesale
banks into its general CRA regulation was perfectly conclusory: "The
lending activities of these banks affect the economic health of the
communities in which they are chartered.
8 7
The Board has shown itself willing to penalize wholesale banks for
failing in their CRA obligations. For example, in 1989 it denied what
appeared to be an inconsequential application by holding companies
of Continental Bank, the Chicago wholesale bank, to acquire the tiny
($14.6 million in deposits) Grand Canyon State Bank of Scottsdale,
Arizona.8 8 The denial was based heavily on Continental's alleged fail-
ure to meet its CRA obligations.8 9 The Board took pains to observe
that although Continental was a wholesale bank, it could still comply
with the mandate of the CRA by activities such as
lending to inner-city revitalization efforts, supporting state and local
governmental financing efforts, lending to small or minority-owned
businesses [the Board did not explain why lending to a minority-
owned business qualified for credit under a statute that mentions
nothing about minority preference], lending support for low-income
85 See Anat Bird, Community Investment Act is Fundamentally Flawed, Am. Banker, Dec.
18, 1990, at 4.
86 12 C.F.R. § 228.100 (1992).
87 Id.
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multi-family rehabilitation and new construction projects, lending to
or otherwise financing non-profit developers of low-income housing
and small business development, or financing major upgrades and/or
expansion of industrial plants that would otherwise relocate outside
of the city served by the bank.'
These may be valuable activities for financial institutions to under-
take, but, with one exception, they are not ones for which a bank
specializing in major commercial loans is particularly suited. The
exception for loans to big businesses that threaten to leave a city is the
one activity on the laundry list that a wholesale bank appears well-
qualified to undertake, and, in that respect, is relatively
unproblematic. It is, however, difficult to see why, in the name of
preserving communities, businesses should be rewarded with
favorable loan treatment by depository institutions when they
threaten to leave, or why loans to big businesses are a particularly
effective means for serving the credit needs of low-income and moder-
ate-income residents. Although the Continental case presented spe-
cial features, which we discuss further below,91 it clearly stands as a
warning to wholesale banks that they must revamp their operations
and enter lines of business for which they are not particularly quali-
fied and in which they had previously determined, as a matter of busi-
ness judgment, not to engage.
Trust Banks and Private Banks. Perhaps equally troubling is the
situation of specialized banks, such as those that focus on trust serv-
ices or private banking for individuals. 92 These banks may find it dif-
ficult to advance credit to their local communities simply because
they are not operated with the purpose or intent of entering that busi-
ness. Under the CRA, however, they may be forced to extend their
operations outward into community lending even though such activi-
ties are not consistent with their business plans and present no syner-
gies with existing operations.
Banks with Conservative Investment Strategies. The CRA also
tends to force banks into a rigid mold with respect to their asset poli-
cies. The economic forces operating on a banking institution do not
dictate that it make any particular portion of its assets available in
90 Id. at 304-05.
91 See infra notes 172-73 and accompanying text.
92 See Linda Corman, Banks Struggling to Meet CRA Rules at Special Units, Am. Banker,
May 6, 1991, at 6.
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lending.93 A bank could purchase corporate, municipal, or national
bonds instead, or could acquire other nonloan financial assets. Such a
bank might be safer, and might even be more profitable, than its com-
petitors that make a higher volume of loans. Yet it might also raise
the eyebrows of the bank examiner who expects to see a suitable per-
centage of the bank's assets devoted to lending.
This problem beset the Cambridge State Bank of Cambridge, Min-
nesota, a stable and profitable institution that received a "substantial
noncompliance" CRA rating. The problem, from the standpoint of
the bank examiners, was that the bank simply devoted too many of its
assets to investments in bonds: in the words of the report,
"[m]anagement's ultraconservative lending practices appear to be dis-
couraging applications for credit, especially in the real estate lending
area." 94 It seems odd, to say the least, that a bank would be criticized
by bank examiners for conservative lending practices and for not
making enough funds available in real estate loans, given the severe
difficulties that real estate lending has caused for banks and thrift
institutions nationwide over the past five years. If Citibank had
invested in government bonds, instead of making huge amounts of
real estate loans during the 1980s, it could have avoided hundreds of
millions of dollars in losses that it experienced as a result of the crash
in the commercial real estate market.9" But then, apparently, it would
have been vulnerable to attack by CRA examiners or activists for
engaging in "ultraconservative" lending practices.
IV. SAFETY AND SOUNDNESS IMPLICATIONS
We now consider the impact of the CRA on the safety and sound-
ness of the banking industry. This section considers: First, whether
CRA loans and other activities represent investments of bank capital
that are as profitable as other loans on a risk-adjusted basis; second,
the impact of the CRA on bank market structure; and finally, the
effect of the CRA on bank portfolio diversification.
93 See Macey & Miller, supra note 46, at 172-251 (describing legal regulation applicable to a
wide range of bank investments).
94 See Bill Atkinson, A Bank That Won't Bend to Meet CRA Standards, Am. Banker, Apr.
22, 1991, at 6.
95 See, e.g., Fred Vogelstein & Tom Leander, Citi Loses $885 Million and Suspends
Dividend; Chemical, Hanover Post Profits, Am. Banker, Oct. 16, 1991, at 1.
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A. Profitability of CRA Loans
Advocates of the CRA often claim that depository institutions
should not object to their obligations under the Act because they can
lend to low-income and moderate-income neighborhoods and still
make a profit. The thesis is that the banking industry has failed to
recognize the numerous profit opportunities available in these com-
munities. Thus, in this view, the CRA is not inconsistent with the
safety and soundness of the banking industry because a CRA loan is
not an unsafe or unsound loan.96 The premise that banks can fully
comply with the CRA without sacrificing profit is implied in the stat-
ute itself, which states that depository institutions should help meet
the credit needs of local communities "consistent with the safe and
sound operation of such institutions. " 97
There is undoubtedly truth to the argument that profitable loan
opportunities exist in low-income and moderate-income neighbor-
hoods, and that some of these loans would not be made if it were not
for the CRA. Loans are illiquid assets that require extensive investi-
gation, monitoring, and analysis.98 In the absence of government
compulsion, depository institutions will engage in costly search to find
profitable lending opportunities only up to the point where the bene-
fits of an additional unit of a search equal the costs of that search. 99
The thumb on the scales administered by the CRA causes depository
institutions to engage in more search for lending opportunities in low-
income and moderate-income communities, and, not surprisingly,
some opportunities are being discovered.
This does not, however, mean that depository institutions were
behaving uneconomically before the CRA became effective, or that
heavy-handed government intervention under the CRA is plausibly
going to increase the efficiency of lending by depository institutions by
forcing them to take actions that would be in their own economic self-
96 See, e.g., Marilyn F. Friedman, Profits Await in CRA Home Loans, Am. Banker, Jan. 9,
1992, at 4, 11.
97 12 U.S.C. § 2901(b).
98 See Douglas W. Diamond & Philip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. Pol. Econ. 401 (1983) (loans are illiquid assets); Macey & Miller, America's
Banking System, supra note 76, at 774-75 (traditional bank loans require "ongoing, continuous
monitoring").
99 See George J. Stigler, The Economics of Information, 69 J. Pol. Econ. 213 (1961),
reprinted in George J. Stigler, The Organization of Industry 171 (1968).
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interest to take in any event. Nor does it prove that the CRA is con-
sistent with the safety and soundness of depository institutions. The
fact that there are some profitable loans to be made in low-income and
moderate-income communities does not mean that greatly increasing
lending in such communities is going to be a profitable activity. The
existence of a few profitable loans will not make CRA activities as a
whole profitable if other loans turn out to be unprofitable. An angler
who casts a line outside the best fishing grounds might catch some
fish, but that does not mean that such a strategy is a profitable use of
the angler's time.
It is quite evident that, despite the occasional profitable CRA loan,
the general effect of the CRA is to reduce depository institution safety
and soundness. Regulators explicitly encourage banks to make loans
on terms that would not be available to applicants from outside the
pale of CRA favoritism. For example, regulators award extra CRA
points to institutions that utilize "more flexible" lending criteria when
making CRA loans. 1°° Although the applicable regulation quickly
recites that such "flexible" loans must be "consistent with safe and
sound practices," it is difficult to imagine what "more flexible" could
mean, if not more risky, or more generous with respect to terms. Sim-
ilarly, the regulations encourage "high loan-to-value-ratio" mortgage
loans in local communities, 101 which means nothing other than that
the depository institution should incur greater risks. Although the
regulations again quickly offer the thought that such loans should be
backed by private mortgage insurance, such mortgage insurance is
itself neither default-free nor costless.
Depository institutions are also encouraged to earn CRA credits by
cashing government checks or offering low-cost checking accounts."2
But cashing government checks is not a riskless or costless enterprise,
especially in a low-income community; the depository institution
bears a fraud risk if it cashes a check for a thief. Of course, a deposi-
tory institution could cover this risk by charging a high check-cashing
fee, or by requiring extensive documentation from persons wishing to
cash checks, but if it did so it would probably forfeit the CRA credit
for which it instituted the service in the first place.
100 See Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the Community
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As regards low-cost checking, it is evident virtually from the name
of the service that the enterprise is unlikely to be profitable. Accord-
ing to a recent American Bankers Association study, more banks are
offering "lifeline" checking accounts for low-income consumers,
which offer fees that are reduced or even waived.10" In itself, this may
sound like a change for the better. But the same study reported that
forty percent of banks offering no-frills checking accounts operated
this service at a loss, or at most broke even, in 1990-91 1 4---a dismal
profit record that indicates that such services are often not in the best
interest of banks in the absence of the artificial incentive of the CRA.
Whereas the CRA encourages depository institutions to devote
depositor funds to low-profit or losing propositions in derogation of
overall economic welfare, it discourages investment practices that
until recently would have been considered paragons of prudent bank-
ing. Institutions that adhere to old-fashioned, conservative lending
practices-which one might have thought would earn credit from
bank examiners concerned with promoting an institution's safety and
soundness-may well find themselves instead at the receiving end of
the regulatory lash. Consider Farmers and Merchant's Bank of Long
Beach, California. This medium-sized institution ($1.3 billion in
assets) is the best-capitalized bank of its size in California, with share-
holders' equity equaling 16.5% of assets.10 5 The bank earns a return
on assets of over two percent, double what is considered excellent per-
formance by industry standards. 10 6 A well-managed, solvent institu-
tion of this type would seem exactly the sort of depository institution
that bank regulators should prize in the wake of Lincoln Savings and
the other high-rolling institutions that failed in the 1980s at the cost
of billions of taxpayer funds. But the bank's conservative lending
strategy did not sit well with regulators, who accused it of being in
"substantial noncompliance" with the CRA. In 1992 the bank was
served with a cease-and-desist order by the Federal Reserve Board,
103 See ABA Study Shows Increasing Focus on Low-Income Consumers, Bank Letter, Aug.
12, 1991 (available in LEXIS, Banks Library, Allbnk File).
104 Id.
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the first time such an enforcement weapon has been used against an
institution for alleged CRA shortcomings. 1°7
B. Impact on Market Structure
The CRA has impeded the ability of the nation's banking system to
cope with the structural weaknesses in the provision of banking serv-
ices that result from an excessive number of small banking institu-
tions.10 8  The great majority of banking analysts agree that
consolidation of banking institutions is inevitable over the coming
years, and that bank mergers offer one valuable mechanism by which
bank assets can be transferred to more efficient users. 0 9 A relatively
unencumbered merger process has important implications for both
the solvency and efficiency of the industry: If the legal system did not
place undue obstacles in the path of bank mergers (including hostile
acquisitions), assets of weak or badly managed depository institutions
would more often be transferred to efficient management before a
depository institution became insolvent."
0
As presently administered, the CRA impedes this desirable process
of bank mergers and acquisitions. Given the time-sensitive nature of
the merger and acquisition process, a CRA-based delay to a proposed
merger will often be tantamount to denying it altogether. If a CRA
examination is underway or scheduled for the near future, the Federal
Reserve Board is likely to defer approving a merger application until
the examination is completed."' The Fed has not been receptive to
requests that it accelerate an examination in order to facilitate a
107 Id. at 1.
108 See Miller, supra note 48, at 1102-05 (noting that larger banks tend to be less risky than
smaller institutions).
109 For a sampling, see Carter H. Golembe, Consolidation and Competition in the Financial
Services Industry, 9 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 451 (1990); Robert A. Litan, Interstate Banking
and Product-Line Freedom: Would Broader Powers Have Helped the Banks?, 9 Yale J. Reg.
521 (1992); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Bank Failures, Risk Monitoring, and the
Market for Bank Control, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1153, 1202-25 (1988).
110 See Macey & Miller, supra note 109, at 1212-23.
111 Rodgin Cohen, The New Phase of Bank Consolidation: Regulatory Issues and
Considerations, 27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 63, 81 (1992). An example is the Fed's decision to
defer First Union Corporation's application to acquire Florida National Banks of Florida, Inc.
until the completion of a scheduled CRA compliance examination. See Marion A. Cowell, Jr.
& Monty D. Hagler, The Community Reinvestment Act in the Decade of Bank Consolidation,
27 Wake Forest L. Rev. 83, 97 (1992).
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merger.112 Moreover, if a proposed merger stimulates a CRA protest,
as most mergers of any size do today, the banking agencies may also
delay approval in order to conduct hearings on the CRA issues. In
the recent BankAmerica/Security Pacific merger, for example, the
Fed held four public hearings devoted to the CRA aspects of the pro-
posed combination.
11 3
Even if delay does not preclude a merger, the increased costs of the
anticipated CRA protests must be considered. Responding to CRA
protests is expensive, requiring extensive managerial attention and use
of public relations media. Moreover, the protests will almost cer-
tainly generate adverse publicity that may harm the institution's repu-
tation and customer base. More significant still are the costs of the
uneconomic loans that are the implicit price of CRA approval.
Although the recent spate of highly publicized commitments by merg-
ing banks to make billions of dollars available in community lending
are largely window-dressing, 14 the Act does induce institutions to
increase their level of CRA loans in connection with proposed merg-
ers or acquisitions. The cost of these loans is an implicit tax that the
CRA imposes on the process of depository institution consolidation.
The fact that some very large mergers have taken place notwith-
standing these costs does not indicate that the CRA has no effect; they
indicate only that the institutions in question determined that the
transaction was sufficiently desirable to warrant going forward despite
the costs of the CRA. Bank managers considering whether to engage
in a merger or other significant acquisition must take into account the
likelihood of a CRA challenge and the attendant increased costs and
adverse publicity. At the margin, some bank mergers or acquisitions
that would occur in the absence of the CRA are deterred by the threat
of a CRA protest and do not occur. This is not true merely as a
matter of theory. There are documented cases in which depository
institutions have elected not to pursue a planned acquisition because
of the anticipated costs of a CRA protest. For example, Harris
Bancorp, a major Chicago institution with $13.1 billion in assets,
entered an agreement to merge with First Geneva Banqueshares, a
Wisconsin holding company, but abandoned the agreement upon
112 See Cohen, supra note 111, at 81-82.
113 See BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 338, 339 (1992) (Order Approving the
Merger of Bank Holding Companies).
114 See infra notes 150-58 and accompanying text.
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learning that the Federal Reserve Board would likely deny the appli-
cation because Harris' lead bank had received a "needs to improve"
CRA rating in its most recent examination.11 5
C Portfolio Diversification
The CRA imposes yet another risk for depository institutions: It
reduces their ability to diversify their asset portfolios by making loans
outside their local geographic areas, thus hedging against the chance
of a significant downturn in the local economy. Just as an individual
investor can improve his or her situation by obtaining a diversified
investment portfolio,11 6 a depository institution can do the same by
diversifying its loan portfolio (and, indeed, by diversifying its asset
portfolio generally by including investments other than loans). This
basic insight is reflected in a variety of existing banking regulations-
for example, the regulations limiting the amount that a depository
institution can lend to any one borrower are clearly designed to
encourage a rough form of portfolio diversification.11 7 But the impor-
tance of portfolio diversification appears to have been forgotten when
it comes to the CRA, which strongly encourages depository institu-
tions to reduce the diversification of their portfolios by concentrating
lending activity within an undiversified geographic area.
V. COMPLIANCE COSTS
The CRA might seem to impose relatively minor costs of compli-
ance on depository institutions and their regulators. The institution
must come up with a CRA plan, file a notice, maintain a file for public
inspection, and stand ready to answer queries of federal bank examin-
ers about CRA policies and procedures. The examiner must evaluate
the institution's record of meeting community credit needs in connec-
tion with on-site examinations. The burden seems, though not mini-
mal, at least bearable.
This view of the CRA, however, greatly understates the actual
compliance costs. Bankers today regard the CRA as the single most
115 Ed Dillon, Scuttled Deal in the West Illustrates Impact of CRA, Am. Banker, Jan. 8,
1992, at 9.
116 See R.A. Brealey, An Introduction to Risk and Return from Common Stocks 102 (2d
ed. 1983).
117 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. § 84 (1988).
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costly regulation facing them, a statement that carries weight in light
of the manifold, complex, and arcane regulations governing deposi-
tory institutions today.'18 That bankers should single out the CRA
among this parade of red tape is a powerful testament to the actual
costs of compliance.
In this section, we consider some of these compliance costs, focus-
ing on (1) direct costs of compliance; (2) the costs of regulatory
imprecision; and (3) the costs of conducting CRA compliance by
means of public relations campaigns that may be only tangentially
related, at best, to matters of substance.
A. Direct Compliance Costs
The direct costs of complying with the CRA are already substantial
and continue to rise. One survey of banking professionals in the Mid-
Atlantic region found that, on average, banks spent fifty-nine dollars
in administrative compliance costs for every one million dollars in
assets in 1989, the first year of the new CRA regime, and that a
majority of the institutions polled planned to more than double their
CRA compliance spending in 1990.119 Similarly, a study compiled by
the American Bankers Association in 1992 concluded that the bank-
ing industry spent $10.7 billion complying with government regula-
tions in 1991, and that the single most costly regulation of all was the
CRA' 20
CRA exams can tie up the energies of bank personnel and bank
examiners for substantial periods. A recent CRA examination of
Manufacturers Hanover Trust Co. required more than five months of
time for two examiners from the Federal Reserve Bank of New York,
and the CRA examination of Bank of America by the Comptroller of
118 See infra text accompanying note 120. For our introduction to some of these
regulations, see Macey & Miller, supra note 46.
119 John C. Foreman & J. McDuffie Brunson, CRA: Bankers on the Defensive, Bank
Mgmt., Jan. 1991, at 35.
120 Barbara A. Rehm, ABA: Cost of Compliance Equals 59% of Bank Profits, Am. Banker,
June 18, 1992, at 1, 12. These statistics should be evaluated with some care, however, because
they are based on bankers' self-reports in response to a survey at a time when the American
Bankers Association was preparing a campaign to challenge the high costs of government
regulation. Nonetheless, it is clear that the CRA represents a substantial burden for
depository institutions even relative to other forms of government regulation.
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the Currency required six weeks of work by up to four examiners. 21
These examinations burden not only the regulators, who may have
other things to do with their time, but also the banks themselves,
because they must make their facilities and personnel available to
respond to the regulators' queries and feedback.
The costs of the CRA are not limited to urban banks. Smaller
banks in rural areas may also be forced to undergo massive regulatory
scrutiny of their community reinvestment policies. For example, one
small institution in rural Nebraska, with only sixteen million dollars
in assets, reportedly was subjected to a week-long CRA exam by six
examiners. 122 Although this story is somewhat anomalous, it appears
clear that a CRA examination can be disruptive for institutions of all
sizes.
B. Regulatory Imprecision
CRA ratings are inexact and subjective. They are based on an
imprecise evaluation of twelve factors, each of them vague, that are
set forth in the applicable regulations without guidance as to which
are most important, which should trump in the event of conflict, and
so on. 123 As if the first eleven of these factors were not vague enough,
the twelfth sweeps in anything else that the bureaucrats might con-
sider relevant to the institution's CRA compliance, thus guaranteeing
maximum uncertainty of application. Even the Federal Financial
Institutions Examination Council, the body charged with providing
guidance as to the requirements of the act, admits that CRA ratings
depend on a "variety of unique, complex factors," that the guidelines
are "generally descriptive," that "all attributes do not apply to every
institution," and, in sum, that "[a]ssessing the CRA performance [of
121 Ellen Braitman, Hanover CRA Exam Nears Month 5: Other Banks Fear Lengthy
Benchmark Will Be Set, Am. Banker, Jan. 31, 1991, at 5. These appear to be on the high end
of the spectrum. The Federal Reserve Board has reported that its examiners spent an average
of 55 hours conducting CRA examinations on institutions with more than $500 million in
assets in 1988, and less for smaller institutions. See Enforcement of the Community
Reinvestment Act: Hearing before the Subcomm. on Consumer and Regulatory Affairs of the
Senate Comm. on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. 25 (1989). The
Office of Comptroller of the Currency spent an average of 21 work days on CRA examinations
of institutions with more than $10 billion in assets in 1988. Id. at 78.
122 "Mindless" Regulations Attacked, Am. Banker, July 6, 1992, at 7.
123 The twelve factors are these:
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an institution] is a process that does not rely on absolute
standards."
124
The vagueness of these factors is compounded by the notoriously
circular language that the agencies offer as purported definitions of
the four CRA ratings. For banks rated "outstanding," the agencies
have this to say: "An institution in this group has an outstanding rec-
ord of, and is a leader in, ascertaining and helping to meet the credit
needs of its entire delineated community, including low-income and
moderate-income neighborhoods, in a manner consistent with its
resources and capabilities." 12  Equally helpful is the definition for
"satisfactory" performance: "An institution in this group has a satis-
factory record of ascertaining and helping to meet the credit needs of
its entire delineated community, including low-income and moderate-
income neighborhoods, in a manner consistent with its resources and
(a) Activities conducted by the bank to ascertain the credit needs of its community,
including the extent of the bank's efforts to communicate with members of its
community regarding the credit services being provided by the bank;
(b) The extent of the bank's marketing and special credit-related programs to make
members of the community aware of the credit services offered by the bank;
(c) The extent of participation by the bank's board of directors in formulating the
bank's policies and reviewing its performance with respect to the purposes of the
Community Reinvestment Act;
(d) Any practices intended to discourage applications for types of credit set forth in
the bank's CRA statement(s);
(e) The geographic distribution of the bank's credit extensions, credit applications,
and credit denials;
(f) Evidence of prohibited discriminatory or other illegal credit practices;
(g) The bank's record of opening and closing offices and providing services at offices;
(h) The bank's participation, including investments, in local community
development and redevelopment projects or programs;
(i) The bank's origination of residential mortgage loans, housing rehabilitation loans,
home improvement loans, and small business or small farm loans within its community,
or the purchase of such loans originated in its community;
(j) The bank's participation in governmentally insured, guaranteed, or subsidized
loan programs for housing, small businesses, or small farms;
(k) The bank's ability to meet various community credit needs based on its financial
condition and size, and legal impediments, local economic conditions, and other factors;
and
(1) Other factors that, in the Comptroller's judgment reasonably bear upon the extent
to which a national bank is helping to meet the credit needs of its entire community.
Assessing the Record of Performance, 12 C.F.R. § 25.7 (1992); see Uniform Interagency Com-
munity Reinvestment Act Guidelines for Disclosure of Written Evaluations and Revisions to
Assessment Rating System, 54 Fed. Reg. 52,914, 52,916 (1989).
124 Id.
125 Id.
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capabilities." 126 For "needs to improve," we learn the following: "An
institution in this group needs to improve its overall record of ascer-
taining and helping to meet the credit needs of its entire delineated
community, including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in a
manner consistent with its resources and capabilities."1 27 And, to
make matters perfectly clear, the category of "substantial noncompli-
ance" is defined as follows: "An institution in this group has a sub-
stantially deficient record of ascertaining and helping to meet the
credit needs of its entire delineated community, including low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods, in a manner consistent with its
resources and capabilities."
' 128
Moreover, these ratings, although nominally uniform across agen-
cies, may assume different interpretations depending on the rater.
CRA performance is often a function of the regulator preparing the
report, or even of the particular office within the regulatory agency
that has primary responsibility for the examination.
129
Bankers have tended to view the CRA ratings as subjective and
unsatisfactory. A recent survey of commercial bankers found a pat-
tern of "anxiety, frustration, and uncertainty" in response to the
problems of complying with the CRA.130 Sixty-six percent of the
respondents considered disclosure of CRA ratings to be potentially
misleading due to the subjective nature of the evaluations, whereas
only thirty-one percent detected a consensus among regulators as to
how CRA activity should be measured and rated.13 1 In the words of
one banker, "I just wish [the regulators] would figure out what they
want .... I have provided loan analyses by zip code, census track and
county. They are still not satisfied and are requesting another analysis
by sub-census track. This is costing a fortune."
1 32
Even after receiving a favorable rating from the relevant agency, a
depository institution has no assurance that it will not face a CRA




129 See Warren W. Traiger, Examining Agencies Need to Fine-Tune CRA Standards, Am.
Banker, Oct. 28, 1991, at 8.
130 See Foreman & Brunson, supra note 119, at 35.
131 Id. at 34.
132 Id.
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tutions that had received "outstanding" or "satisfactory" CRA rat-
ings on recent examinations. 133 Significantly, although the regulators
could easily adopt a policy of summarily rejecting protests against
institutions with high CRA ratings, they have not done so. On the
contrary, the agencies specifically warn that, although a favorable
CRA examination is an "important, and often controlling" factor,
"[lt is not conclusive evidence... in the face of significant and sup-
port [sic] allegations from a commenter."'
134
The Federal Reserve Board reinforced this message by denying, on
CRA grounds, an application by the $629 million in assets First Inter-
state BancSystem of Montana, Inc. to acquire Commerce BancShares
of Sheridan, Wyoming.1 35 To all appearances the application should
have been routine. The two institutions were already under common
ownership, and six of First Interstate's seven subsidiary banks had
received "satisfactory" ratings in their most recent CRA examina-
tion. 36 The Fed quashed the deal, however, because Colstrip, a tiny
subsidiary bank with twelve million dollars in assets,1 37 had allegedly
failed to make loans on the Northern Cheyenne Indian Reservation in
Lame Deer, Montana. 38 Thus, the allegedly deficient CRA perform-
ance of a subsidiary bank holding less than two percent of the holding
company's assets, and only about one percent of the assets of the pro-
posed postmerger firm, was deemed sufficient to derail a merger in
which the remainder of the institutions had demonstrated satisfactory
CRA performance.
133 The recent Bank of America/Security Pacific merger is only the most prominent of
many such cases. See infra text accompanying notes 161-65.
134 Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the Community
Reinvestment Act, supra note 82, at 13,745.
135 First Interstate BancSystem, Inc., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 1007, 1007 (1991) (Order Denying
Merger of Bank Holding Companies); Dillon, supra note 115, at 9.
136 Dillon, supra note 115, at 9.
137 Id.
138 First Interstate Bancsystem, Inc., 77 Fed. Res. Bull. at 1008-09; Dillon, supra note 115,
at 9. The bank responded by pledging to make $4 million in loans to reservation residents,
installing an automated teller machine on the reservation, placing a tribal member on its board
of directors, and hiring a reservation resident as a management trainee. See Bill Atkinson,
Montana Bank Gets Merger Nod After Lending More to Indians, Am. Banker, Nov. 3, 1992,
at 5.
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C. Compliance as Public Relations
The agencies charged with CRA enforcement have adopted exter-
nal criteria for evaluating compliance with the statute. As a practical
matter, this may be the best that the regulators can do to complete
their difficult mission of evaluating an institution's essentially subjec-
tive efforts to serve local communities. This reliance on external indi-
cia of CRA compliance, however, generates pressures for depository
institutions to make a showing of compliance that may, in fact, be
mostly window-dressing. As a result, CRA compliance strategy is
often largely public relations.
To guard against negative CRA ratings, depository institutions are
well-advised to engage in elaborate "papering" of their CRA activi-
ties.13 9 What matters is not so much whether the depository institu-
tion has taken actual steps to serve the credit needs of its local
community, as whether it has prepared a written file that can be
handed over to the examiners for their review. The better the docu-
mentation, the more likely the institution will receive a good CRA
rating.1" CRA evaluations are performed by professional bank
examiners who, consistent with the traditions of their profession,
want to see written records, thereby conforming to the bank examiner
adage: "'[I]f it is not documented, it does not exist.' "141 The banking
agencies are explicit in their demands for documentation: They warn
that "[a] poorly documented reocrd [sic] may prolong the application
process in order for the reviewing Agency to collect the information
needed for its decision."
142
This focus on documentation, although understandable from the
perspective of bureaucratic procedures, does not guarantee that an
institution will take concrete, effective steps to change its actual prac-
tices. A recent study by the Community Reinvestment Institute-an
organization devoted to community reinvestment causes-reviewed
home lending records for seventy banks and thrifts in California and
Massachusetts with public CRA ratings and concluded that docu-
139 See Sam Zuckerman, Documenting Strong Program Is Key to Getting Top Rating, Am.
Banker, Nov. 5, 1990, at 6.
140 See id.
141 Francis X. Grady, CRA Success Starts with a Plan, Am. Banker, July 30, 1991, at 4.
142 Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the Community
Reinvestment Act, supra note 82, at 13,746.
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mentation, not actual performance, was the determinative factor for
most CRA ratings.
14 3
In furtherance of a program of CRA compliance through public
relations, experts advise that the depository institution's board of
directors appoint a committee of the board charged with CRA evalua-
tion, which should meet at least quarterly and keep detailed minutes
of its proceedings that can be heralded during the show-and-tell of the
CRA examination. 144 It is also advisable, according to public rela-
tions experts specializing in CRA compliance, for the depository insti-
tution to "interact" with local community groups and leaders by
dispatching its officers on courtesy calls. 145 Town meetings are rec-
ommended.1 46 Institutions can earn additional CRA points by dis-
tributing customer satisfaction surveys and conducting special market
studies.1 47 The institution should engage in vigorous marketing and
advertising campaigns to identify itself to members of the local com-
munity. 148 All of this sound and fury must, of course, be elaborately
documented in the bank's files.
These activities, which probably have little value in actually supply-
ing credit to local communities, would not be especially problematic if
they were not expensive. But devoting staff and resources to CRA
compliance rituals is not cheap. J.P. Morgan, for example, was
encouraged by its regulators to advertise the fact that it was in good
compliance with the CRA-and thus spent fifty thousand dollars a
year on this form of needless self-promotion. 49
The public relations strategies utilized by banking institutions to
satisfy their regulators as to their CRA compliance have become
highly sophisticated, at least for larger institutions. Recently, deposi-
tory institutions have utilized the strategy of the dramatic announce-
ment of planned loans, designed to garner maximum media attention
and favorable public relations. After NCNB Corp. and C&S/Sovran
Corp., two major southern bank holding companies, agreed to merge
143 Linda Corman, Study Finds Documentation Biggest Factor in CRA Rating, Am.
Banker, June 3, 1991, at 7.
144 See, e.g., Grady, supra note 141, at 4.




149 Bill Atkinson, Complying with Regulations: A Costly and Growing Burden, Am.
Banker, June 24, 1991, at 1, 10.
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in 1991, they jointly pledged, with considerable fanfare, to extend ten
billion dollars in "community development" loans over a ten year
period.150 The pledge came after political activists announced their
intention to file CRA challenges to the proposed combination. 5
BankAmerica Corp. topped this with a twelve billion dollars pledge
over ten years during the course of its lobbying to obtain approval of
its proposed merger with Security Pacific Corp.1 52 Barnett Banks,
Inc. pledged in June, 1991 to lend more than two billion dollars to
low-income and moderate-income families over five years, a smaller
program than some of the others but a larger one relative to the size
of the institution.1
5 3
Dramatic pledges of this type often appear, on analysis, to be
mostly hype. The ten billion dollar pledge by NCNB and C&S/Sov-
ran, for example, was not backed by any binding commitments, nor
did it actually represent a major expansion of community lending by
the institutions, which together had extended between six hundred
and eight hundred million dollars a year in CRA lending even before
the announcement. 154 When anticipated growth and inflation is
counted into the picture, a ten billion dollar loan commitment over a
ten year period does not constitute a major change in corporate pol-
icy. Many observers view these CRA pledges with skepticism. Ron-
ald Zimmerman, a Vice President at the Federal Reserve Bank of
Atlanta, remarked that "[w]e look at them more as publicity, in many
cases.... We recognize that a lot of what [they] say they're going to
do, they're already doing. I guess they're hoping to avoid protests
that way."
' 155
Why do banking institutions engage in these high-profile media
blitzes, especially when their commitments are viewed by many,
including regulators, as signifying little? A principal advantage of
vague, general pledges to extend credit in the future is that they cir-
cumvent the problem of obtaining the support of many different pres-
sure groups, each of which desires support for its own pet projects and
150 Ellen Braitman & Yvette Kantrow, NCNB and C&S Make $10 Billion CRA Pledge,
Am. Banker, Aug. 7, 1991, at 1.
151 See id. at 1, 6.
152 Kenneth Cline, Doubts Voiced on Deal-Related Loan Pledges, Am. Banker, July 7,
1992, at 6.
153 Id.
154 Braitman & Kantrow, supra note 150, at 6.
155 Cline, supra note 152, at 6.
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activities. In the early days of the CRA, a depository institution wish-
ing to consummate a transaction could neutralize a CRA protest with
a suitably generous commitment to a particular protesting group.
15 6
That strategy no longer works in many cases, especially for large
mergers that are likely to attract the attention of many interest groups
with competing goals. The transaction costs of settling with these
diverse groups become prohibitive. 1 7 Promising large amounts of
money in the future tends to overcome these transaction costs while
neutralizing opposition from individual groups, because no one group
can know in advance how much it will obtain. As one housing
activist in Atlanta remarked after learning of the NCNB-C&S/Sovran
pledge, "My first response is to be optimistic [but] I'm not sure what
the ten billion dollar amount is for and what will be used in our
area.
158
In addition to overcoming the problem of negotiating with multiple
protestants, the long-term pledge carries the additional advantage,
from the point of view of the depository institution, of effectively
preapproving the institution's subsequent activities so long as the
institution meets the targets set in its initial announcement. As long
as the institution meets or exceeds the terms of its pledge, it will be
hard for groups that applauded the pledge at the time it was made to
complain effectively about the institution's CRA performance in the
future.
VI. THE INFLUENCE OF ACTIVIST GROUPS
A principal effect of the CRA has been to enhance the power of
activist groups dedicated to various causes related to community
development.1 59 Many of these groups have become adept at using
the CRA as a vehicle for extracting payments from depository institu-
tions, either for their own maintenance and welfare or for their
favored causes. The CRA works well for these purposes because it
allows groups to bring pressure against depository institutions at a
156 See Cohen, supra note Ill, at 81.
157 See id. ("[Tlhe proliferation of protests and protestants is increasingly giving rise to the
situation where various commitments by the applicant will resolve some but not all of the
protests.").
158 See Braitman & Kantrow, supra note 150, at 6.
159 Peter D. Schellie, Current Developments with the Community Reinvestment Act, 42
Bus. Law. 943, 946-48 (1987).
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point of maximum vulnerability-when the institution has applied for
permission to consummate a transaction and stands to lose both the
costs of negotiating the transaction and the expected profits from the
deal if the application is not approved. To avoid these losses, institu-
tions are usually willing to remit some of their wealth to the commu-
nity groups that mount the most vociferous challenges to the
applicant's performance.
There appears to be little relationship between an institution's
actual CRA performance and the attitude of some pressure groups.
Institutions have received one of the two highest CRA ratings only to
be hit with a challenge by activist groups when they subsequently
applied for a depository facility. One notorious case is that of Manu-
facturers Hanover Trust Co. of New York. In March, 1991, Manu-
facturers announced that it had received a CRA rating of
"outstanding" from its regulators. Less than three weeks later, Man-
ufacturers learned that its attempt to acquire thirteen branch offices of
another bank had been met by community activists who sought to
block the acquisition on the ground that the bank had failed to live up
to its community reinvestment responsibilities. 1 6
Consider also BankAmerica Corp.'s proposal to acquire Security
Pacific Corp.16 1 All of BankAmerica's subsidiary banks had received
at least a "satisfactory" CRA rating from their primary regulators,
and Bank of America, which accounted for eighty-six percent of the
holding company's consolidated assets, had received an "outstand-
ing" performance rating.1 62 All of Security Pacific's subsidiary banks
had also received "satisfactory" CRA ratings. Twenty-two subsidiary
banks were involved in the merger, all of which had received CRA
ratings of "satisfactory" or better from their primary regulator in the
most recent examination.1 61 One might think, given this record, that
approval of the merger under the CRA would be a foregone conclu-
sion. It was not. Community groups charged that the firms had
failed their local communities. They claimed that the subsidiary banks
had engaged in racial discrimination in advancing home mortgage
160 Linda Corman, CRA Challenges Jolt Top-Rated Institutions, Am. Banker, Mar. 28,
1991, at 1, 8.
161 BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 338, 338 (1992).
162 Id. at 347.
163 Id.
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loans, 16 even though the CRA compliance examinations had found
no evidence of discrimination or other illegal credit practices of any
subsidiary bank of either holding company.16 Although the Federal
Reserve Board ultimately approved the merger, the protests and
attendant unfavorable publicity were a costly distraction for this enor-
mous transaction.
Given the threat posed by activist groups, an institution faced with
a CRA challenge is often well-advised to placate the protestant by
funding its pet project rather than by adopting a more even-handed
approach that would promote community development generally.
The federal regulators encourage this form of settlement of CRA pro-
tests, even though it may result in the funding of some projects over
others without regard to their worthiness. The agencies strongly
encourage "private meetings between an applicant and a protestant"
in order to "resolve differences based on misunderstandings between
the parties." 166 Although the agencies "do not . . .enforce" these
settlements,1 67 it is difficult to see why negotiations behind the scenes
would be encouraged if it were not for the purpose of encouraging,
and implicitly agreeing to respect, the outcomes of such deals.
These dynamics make it prudent for financial institutions that
anticipate making applications for depository facilities in the future to
cultivate community activists in advance of any concrete proposals.
Providing support and assistance to the most effective local pressure
groups and community activists is often the best way to purchase
what amounts to an insurance policy against the threat of a CRA
challenge by these organizations in the future. Supporting such orga-
nizations earns CRA credits with examiners to boot.
As might be expected, local community groups that benefit from a
depository institution's largesse sometimes appear less likely to pro-
test when the institution submits an application for a depository facil-
ity. When Ameritrust Corp. submitted an application to relocate two
branches in Cleveland, eleven pressure groups lodged protests against
the application, claiming that the bank had engaged in redlining and
that the branch relocations would reduce banking services to minority
164 Id. at 355-56.
165 Id. at 356.
166 Statement of the Federal Financial Supervisory Agencies Regarding the Community
Reinvestment Act, supra note 82, at 13,746.
167 Id.
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communities. 168 Marica Nolan, the Executive Director of Neighbor-
hood Housing Services of Cleveland, an organization that had
received financial support from the bank for several years, however,
did not join the protest and, indeed, expressed public surprise at the
charges, praising the bank as an "active player in our community."'
169
When Chemical Bank and Manufacturers Hanover sought
approval for the largest merger in U.S. banking history, a number of
community groups objected to the allegedly unfair lending practices
of the applicant institutions. Conspicuously absent from the protes-
tors, and in fact taking the uncharacteristic role of supporting the
merger and praising certain aspects of the banks' community invest-
ment records, was the well-known Association of Community Organi-
zations for Reform Now-usually referred to under the acronym
ACORN-which has been among the most vocal and effective CRA
interest groups in other cases.'70 Chemical had previously entered
into a "partnership" with ACORN and other community groups "to
provide credit counseling services to loan applicants who have poor
credit histories, excessive debt or need assistance to qualify for a
mortgage loan."'17
1
When the Federal Reserve rejected, largely on CRA grounds, the
application by holding companies of Continental Bank to acquire a
small bank in Arizona, Gale Cincotta, one of the leaders in the initial
campaign for the CRA, objected to the decision and defended Conti-
nental's CRA record.172 Cincotta's group, the National Training and
Information Center, had recently received a twenty million dollar
loan from Continental.
73
Groups such as Neighborhood Legal Services, ACORN, and the
National Training and Information Center are well-respected and
reputable organizations. Not all community activists are so upstand-
168 See Ellen Braitman, supra note 83, Am. Banker, at 1, 5.
169 Id. at 5.
170 See, e.g., Claudia Cummins, Protesters Say Columbia First Shortchanges Its
Community, Am. Banker, July 10, 1992, at 13; Kelley Holland, ACORN Drops In, Am.
Banker, July 15, 1992, at 2; Barbara A. Rehm, Activists Warn Banks that Campaign to Ease
CRA Rules Might Backfire, Am. Banker, June 29, 1992, at 1.
171 See Philip C. Meyer, CRA, Not Antitrust, Is Key Regulatory Factor in Initial
Megamergers, Banking Pol'y Rep., Jan. 6, 1992, at 1, 16.
172 See Lisabeth Weiner, Community Groups Defend Continental, Am. Banker, Feb. 21,
1989, at 1.
173 See id. at 22.
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ing, however. Political and community leaders in low-income and
moderate-income areas often engage in their own business enterprises
or maintain contacts with local entrepreneurs. It would hardly be
surprising if some of these community leaders attempted to use their
power under the CRA as a lever to obtain favorable treatment from a
depository institution. When a local community activist calls on a
bank lending officer to seek a below-market loan, or to vouch for the
credit of an associate who is seeking such a loan, the bank might con-
sider the application long and hard before rejecting it even if the loan
would not meet normal underwriting criteria. The CRA provides a
fertile potential breeding ground for such improper influence,
although for obvious reasons it is difficult to document the actual inci-
dence of such contacts. 174
VII. EVOLUTION OF THE ACT INTO A MEASURE SERVING
SPECIAL INTEREST AGENDAS
As discussed above, the CRA was enacted as a means for ensuring
reinvestment in the entire community. 7 ' Nevertheless, the CRA has
evolved from a statute designed to encourage depository institution
involvement in local communities into one designed to serve organ-
ized interest groups. Banking regulators, for their own political rea-
sons, have readily acquiesced. Depository institutions that make
special efforts to target particular ethnic communities are given points
in CRA evaluations. 176 BankAmerica's successful campaign to win
CRA approval for its Security Pacific takeover is a case in point:
Among other factors, the applicant earned CRA credit for launching
advertising campaigns specifically targeting Hispanic, Black, and
Asian communities. 177 Loans to minority-owned businesses receive
CRA points, despite the fact that the CRA says nothing about minor-
ities and cannot easily be construed as mandating affimative action in
174 We have been informed off the record by several bankers that this kind of contact does
indeed occur, although its extent is unknown.
175 See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
176 See First Union Commits $1 Million to CRA, ABA Banking J., Oct. 1991, at 9
(reporting that First Union Corp., as part of its CRA compliance program, had set up a
program for loans, at the prime rate or below, designed specifically for women and minority
business owners).
177 BankAmerica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. 338, 349 (1992).
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lending.17 Affirmative action on the basis of gender also wins CRA
points with bank regulators. The Federal Reserve Board warmly
praised the Bank of America for participating in a program intended
to increase the supply of credit to women-owned businesses. 7 9
CRA points can also be earned by engaging in philanthropy 8 ' -
especially philanthropy meeting certain "politically correct" criteria,
such as gifts to institutions promoting minority cultures, the condition
of the homeless, or affordable housing for the poor. Even though the
CRA says nothing about charity, and, indeed, by encouraging the
extension of "credit" to local communities might well be seen as not
extending to eleemosynary activities, bank contributions to commu-
nity groups translate into CRA points with regulators. In 1992, for
example, Wells Fargo & Co. donated a landmark Victorian house in
downtown Sacramento, valued at one million dollars, to the La Raza/
Galeria Posada, a group promoting Chicano art. 8' An explicit pur-
pose for the gift was to earn CRA points with the regulators.182 The
gift may have been made in the finest spirit of charity, and there was
nothing objectionable about the recipients of the bank's bounty. The
point, however, is that the CRA was never intended to induce banks
178 The 1989 amendments to the CRA contain no explicit mention of an antidiscrimination
norm, but the legislative history indicates that at least some of the members who voted on the
measure, including its principal sponsor, Congressman Joe Kennedy of Massachusetts, were
concerned about recent reports indicating that racial discrimination in mortgage lending was
pervasive in some parts of the country. See, e.g., 135 Cong. Rec. H-2753 (daily ed. June 15,
1989) (remarks of Rep. Kennedy). The amendments, however, did not deal with racial
discrimination but rather required disclosure of CRA ratings-an important change, to be
sure, but not one reflecting any explicit nondiscrimination norm.
The 1991 amendments added a new section awarding CRA credit to depository institutions
that donate, sell on favorable terms, or make available on a rent-free basis a branch located in a
minority neighborhood, but only if the recipient of the institution's largesse is a minority
depository institution or a women's depository institution. 12 U.S.C. § 2907. Defined as
"minorities" are Black-Americans, Native-Americans, Hispanic-Americans, and Asian-
Americans. Id. § 2907(b)(3) (The 1991 amendments adopt by reference the definition of
"minority" provided in Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, § 1204(c)(3), 103 Stat. 183, 520-21.). Thus, the statute arguably
encourages affirmative action in favor of women and minorities in the award of "exit fees" that
a depository institution might be required to pay in order to get out of an unprofitable branch
in a decaying neighborhood.
179 Bank,4merica Corp., 78 Fed. Res. Bull. at 349.
180 See Grady, supra note 141, at 4.
181 See Teresa Carson, Wells Takes the Cultural Route, Am. Banker, Jan. 13, 1992, at 10.
182 See id.
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to make charitable contributions that they would not otherwise have
made.
Others have attempted to turn the CRA to their advantage by
directing it at objects that it was not intended to serve. The NAACP
for instance, has threatened CRA challenges to institutions that do
not hire more African-American employees. 183 These threats are not
idle. In one case in 1990, the NAACP filed a CRA challenge to the
application of Southern National Corp., of Lumberton, North Caro-
lina, to acquire NBSC Corp. of Sumter, South Carolina. The appli-
cant responded by entering an agreement to increase its African-
American work force in order to satisfy specified numerical quotas, at
which point the NAACP dropped its CRA challenge.184 The Presi-
dent of the NAACP's South Carolina State Conference remarked that
it was "highly unlikely" that the applicant would have agreed to the
hiring quotas had it not faced the CRA challenge.
1 85
To take another example, the Amalgamated Clothing and Textile
Workers Union has actively utilized CRA protests as a means for
serving the interests of the union, which may have had little to do
with community reinvestment.1 86 It has been speculated, for example,
that Amalgamated's decision to protest Continental's acquisition of a
small Arizona bank was in retaliation against Continental for funding
the takeover of a North Carolina textile company that resulted in a
loss of union jobs.
187
The transforming of the CRA into a mechanism for providing spe-
cial benefits for defined ethnic, gender, or other groups is problematic
for a number of reasons. It is not consistent with the language or
183 Kenneth Cline, NAACP to Push for Hiring of More Blacks, Am. Banker, Dec. 10, 1990,
at 1. This despite National City Corp., 67 Fed. Res. Bull. 52, 56 n.15 (1981) (Order Approving
Acquisition of Bank) (stating that the Federal Reserve Board considers employment practices
to be outside scope of CRA).
184 See Cline, supra note 183, at 6.
185 Id.
186 See Jeffrey Marshall, Amalgamated Bloodies Irksome Banks, U.S. Banker, Oct. 1991, at
14.
187 Id. at 16 (citing an unidentified source "close to Continental"). In early 1989, the
Federal Reserve Board agreed with Amalgamated that Continental's reinvestment record was
deficient under the CRA and denied approval of the Arizona merger. Id. In another such
action, in late 1990 Amalgamated filed a CRA protest over Norwest Corp.'s proposed
acquisition of First National Bank of Anoka, a $250-million-asset Minnesota bank. This
protest was allegedly motivated by Norwest's refusal to recommit a loan to a children's
clothing manufacturer with 4000 union employees. Id. at 19. The Fed approved the deal. Id.
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legislative history of the statute. Quite apart from whether it is desir-
able, as a matter of policy, for private institutions to engage in chari-
table giving, affirmative action in credit allocation, or granting favors
to special interest groups, it seems problematic under the system of
separation of powers for banking agencies to exercise a form ofcypres
power to reform a statute in order to serve other goals.1""
VIII. IMPACT ON Low-INCOME COMMUNITIES
Perhaps the most problematic feature of the CRA is its impact on
the communities it was principally designed to serve-low-income,
deteriorating urban communities. As noted above, 8 9 it requires little
imagination to see that a depository institution not presently serving
such a community would be cautious about entering that market,
even if it believed that there might be opportunities for profit in per-
forming depository services there. Serving such communities means
including the area in the institution's community, and therefore being
subject to the CRA's requirement of making loans within the neigh-
borhood that might be significantly more extensive than the institu-
tion would want to make as a matter of its own business judgment.
As a result, the CRA probably harms the very areas that it was osten-
sibly designed to serve by actually reducing the amount of credit that
would be available in those areas as compared with what would be the
situation in the absence of the CRA. 19'
The CRA poses a distinct risk to local communities in another
respect as well. By threatening depository institutions with severe
penalties if they do not advance credit to meet the needs of African-
Americans and other minorities, the CRA has greatly increased the
competitive pressures facing minority-owned institutions that have
188 This is not to suggest that racial discrimination in credit allocation is not a problem
requiring careful attention from policymakers and government officials. Preliminary studies
indicate that mortgage denials are significantly higher for African-Americans and Hispanics
than for whites at similar income levels. See Glenn B. Canner & Dolores S. Smith, Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act: Expanded Data on Residential Lending, 77 Fed. Res. Bull. 859, 868
(1991). More recent data continue to show a higher rate of mortgage denials for African-
American and Hispanic applicants than for white applicants. See, e.g., Claudia Cummins, Fed
Reports Little Change In Loan Bias, Am. Banker, Oct. 28, 1992, at 1, 14.
189 See supra notes 80-81 and accompanying text.
190 See Ray G. Huffaker, Market-Based Policies to Increase Home Mortgage Credit in
Declining Urban Neighborhoods, 106 Banking L.J. 538, 541-46 (1989).
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traditionally served this market segment.1 91 Minority-owned institu-
tions feeling this competitive pressure have charged that their compet-
itors are making below-market loans in their core communities.
192
They have responded by lobbying for changes to the CRA that would
allow a depository institution to earn CRA points by investing in a
minority-owned bank, or in a loan participation arranged by such a
bank, rather than by direct investment in local communities. 193 This
legislation was not enacted, but in 1991 Congress did encourage
depository institutions to subsidize minority and women's banks when
closing branches in minority neighborhoods,194 and in 1992, it
amended the CRA further to clarify that regulators may give CRA
credit for community lending projects undertaken by nonminority-
owned or nonwoman-owned financial institutions in "partnership"
with minority-owned or woman-owned institutions if these projects
meet the credit needs of the community.'9"
IX. THE CRA IN INTEREST GROUP THEORY
The preceding sections have demonstrated what we believe to be
convincing reasons to be skeptical about the CRA. Nevertheless, the
statute appears to be politically popular. Indeed, Congress has
enhanced its effectiveness over the years. 196 If the CRA is such ques-
tionable public policy, why does it appear to be so popular?
The answer, we believe, is that the CRA benefits organized political
interest groups. Principal beneficiaries are community activists, who
enjoy great power at the local level in many jurisdictions and who are
also influential in Congress. As we have seen, some activist organiza-
tions have utilized the CRA to enhance their own political power, to
gain financial support for their favored projects, and to obtain logisti-
191 Minority-owned depository institutions already operate at thinner profit margins than
their white-owned peers. The median return on assets for minority firms with between $50
million dollars and $300 million dollars in assets was 30 basis points, compared with 80 basis
points for white-owned peer institutions, according to one source. Nanine Alexander, Tough
CRA Rules Hurting Minority Banks, U.S. Banker, Sept. 1991, at 70.
192 Id. (citing statement of Bruce Gamble, executive director of The National Bankers
Association, minority bankers industry organization with a membership of 60 banks).
193 Id. at 71.
194 12 U.S.C. § 2907.
195 Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat.
3672.
196 See supra notes 27-37 and accompanying text.
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cal and other assistance for their activities. 197 The CRA has been a
bonanza for activist groups, and although the benefits of the statute
are now somewhat dissipated by competition among different groups,
it still represents a major source of funding and power that these
groups will fight to sustain and enhance.
Small businesses and small farms also profit from the statute.
Loans to these groups qualify for CRA credit, and they may perceive
that, faced with a choice between gaining CRA credit with a loan to a
small business or family farm or a loan to a borrower in a depressed
urban neighborhood, a depository institution might opt for the former
as representing the safer investment. These groups---especially small
businesses-are powerful both at the local and the national political
levels.
The other major beneficiaries of the CRA, ironically enough, are
the banking agencies themselves. The CRA provides a useful mecha-
nism that regulatory agencies can use to increase their authority over
institutions under their jurisdiction. The criteria for evaluating a
bank's CRA performance are so vague that an agency can almost
always plausibly determine to deny an application for a depository
facility on CRA grounds.198 The chance that a bank could success-
fully challenge such a denial in court is vanishingly slight, given the
wide discretion ordinarily accorded to administrative agencies in the
implementation of generalized regulatory mandates. Banks under-
stand this and know that an agency that is dissatisfied with them for
any reason can use the CRA to exact retribution. Armed with this
weapon, the federal banking agencies can exercise ever-increasing
administrative guidance over the banks under their jurisdiction with-
out actually having to cite chapter and verse from the statute books to
justify their demands. 199
It is partly in this light that we understand the decision by the
Board of Governors, referred to earlier, denying on CRA grounds
Continental's application to acquire a small Arizona bank."°° Conti-
nental made this application at a time when it was still operating
197 See supra notes 159-74 and accompanying text.
198 On the vagueness of the criteria, see supra notes 123-37 and accompanying text.
199 See David G. Litt, Jonathan R. Macey, Geoffrey P. Miller & Edward L. Rubin, Politics,
Bureaucracies, and Financial Markets: Bank Entry into Commercial Paper Underwriting in
the United States and Japan, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 369, 385-89 (1990).
200 See supra note 187 and accompanying text.
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under the terms of the government bail-out that followed its failure in
1984.201 Its application was not well-received by several Fed Gover-
nors, who viewed it as an abuse of the terms of the bail-out pro-
gram. 2°  The Board's order itself contained thinly veiled criticisms of
Continental; it noted that the application "raises important public
policy concerns with regard to the potential for distortion of competi-
tion due to continued use of government provided capital in competi-
tion with private capital. 20 3 Reading between the lines, it is plausible
to see the Board using its CRA powers in this case as a means of
reprimanding Continental for its perceived misbehavior in the use of
government-provided funds.2 *
The CRA is popular among many members of Congress because it
represents a means for satisfying the demands of important and
organized constituent groups without increasing the budget deficit or
establishing new federal agencies. Although CRA enforcement is
vested in regulatory agencies, the Act did not establish any new agen-
cies or offices. Moreover, the on-budget costs of CRA are very small,
and to the extent they are more than de minimis, they are incorpo-
rated into the general agency budgets. This is not to say that the
CRA is not funded by a tax-it is-but the tax comes in the form of a
regulatory burden placed on banks that is not included (except indi-
rectly) in the federal budget. The costs are hidden from public view.
Although the CRA benefits powerful interests, it does harm deposi-
tory institutions. The American banking industry, however, was
politically prostrate at the time the CRA was equipped with teeth, in
the thrift bail-out legislation of 1989. Given the vast sums that were
being expended to rescue the thrift industry, it hardly seemed exces-
sive to ask depository institutions to pay a little back in the form of
lending to their local communities. If depository institutions were to
201 See Continental Bank Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. 304, 306 (1989).
202 See Barbara A. Rehm, Behind the Scenes: How Angell Blocked Continental Acquisition,
Am. Banker, Feb. 23, 1989, at 1, 22.
203 See Continental Bank Corp., 75 Fed. Res. Bull. at 306.
204 Noteworthy, in this regard, is the fact that the Board rejected the application even
though the institution had made significant steps toward "improving" its CRA performance in
the future, a fact deemed significant by the two dissenting Governors. See id. at 306 (Heller
and LaWare, dissenting). In another case, the Board could easily have taken Continental's
actions as evidence of substantial improvement and approved the application notwithstanding
the deficiency of the bank's prior performance.
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accept the subsidy of federal deposit insurance, they could jolly well
pay a little back in the form of aid to their local communities.
Thus, the political science of the CRA seems to reduce to this: Sup-
porting the statute is a broad coalition of powerful groups including
activist community groups, small businesses, small farms, and the
bank regulators themselves; opposing it is only a banking industry
that has been relatively politically impotent. Others harmed by the
statute-the general public, and, arguably, the residents of the deteri-
orating urban neighborhoods whom the Act was ostensibly designed
to serve-are not politically organized and play no part in the
calculus. Given this permutation of forces, the statute appears quite
secure, and we see little chance for fundamental reform, although
smaller banks might be able to obtain some relief from the most oner-
ous requirements of the law.
X. TOWARD BETTER ALTERNATIVES
As we mentioned at the outset, the CRA addresses problems of
enormous importance to American life. Although the CRA itself
may be flawed or even counter-productive, there might be alternative
mechanisms available to realize some of the statute's admirable goals.
In the following pages we discuss a few intriguing suggestions,
although we emphasize that none of these ideas is without flaw and
that the problems of revitalizing decaying communities are so
profound and intractable that no government program may be effica-
cious at resolving them.
One interesting model of community credit generation draws on a
device that has proven successful in the Korean-American commu-
nity. Korean-Americans have developed a mechanism for raising
capital solely within the community, which effectively harnesses the
profit motive for the development of productive investments. They
operate lending clubs, known as "kehs," into which each member
makes a monthly contribution. When the pool gets sufficiently large,
the club meets and votes to make a loan to the member with the best
business idea.205 Among the advantages of the keh system is that the
members of the club are all informed about the qualifications of the
applicant, and are positioned to monitor the borrower's performance
205 See Elyssa Getreu, Taking a Lesson From Korea for Lending in the Inner City, Am.
Banker, June 29, 1992, at 7.
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on an ongoing basis. The members of the keh possess a variety of
nonlegal community sanctions to bring pressure against members who
have failed to repay a loan. Thus, even though the keh loans are
unsecured, they probably present a low default risk. Further, the keh
system enlists the participants' profit motive in order to ensure that
the loans are made to the most efficient user of the funds. The keh
system, in short, is true, grass-roots community reinvestment, and is
accomplished without costly government intervention, regulation, or
supervision. A more Americanized variant on the keh system is
found in the substantial growth in Asian community banks, which
have sprouted up to serve Asian-American populations in a number
of cities, and which have prospered by serving this population
group. 2 0
6
At least one banking industry analyst believes that a variant on the
keh system might work more generally as a means for improving the
supply of credit to inner-city neighborhoods. Michael R. Cunning-
ham, a Washington consultant, envisages a bank offering pooled
accounts in which members of inner-city neighborhoods can contrib-
ute each month until the pool reaches a sufficient size.20 7 The bank
would then lend money to one of the members, using the pool as col-
lateral for the loan. Because the funds of each member of the pool
would stand behind the loan, there would be a good incentive for the
members to monitor each other. The bank, meanwhile, would be able
to sell the loans in a secondary market if a third party guarantee could
be provided.208
Although this idea has appeal, it suffers from the fact that the bank
would be the one to make the loan decision. It would appear more
sensible for the members of the pool themselves to decide who should
receive the loan, given the fact that their money is on the line if the
recipient defaults. Further, the members of the pool, rather than the
bank, are the ones with the best knowledge of the applicant's reliabil-
ity. The bank should be placed in the role of administering the loan
pool for a fee, rather than making the loan itself. This quibble aside,
however, Mr. Cunningham's idea has considerable promise as a
206 See James R. Kraus, Asian Community Banks Booming in U.S., Am. Banker, May 11,
1992, at 1.
207 See Getreu, supra note 205, at 7.
208 Id.
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means of promoting savings and economic self-reliance and self-deter-
mination in depressed urban areas.
Other programs that deserve serious consideration, and that are
already in place in some cities, include credit unions at which persons
living in low-income areas pool their funds and determine jointly how
to allocate credit. The Lower East Side People's Federal Credit
Union, in a depressed neighborhood of New York City, has 2,600
mostly Hispanic, low-income members.2 °9 It makes loans of between
one hundred and five thousand dollars to members who would have
difficulty obtaining financing elsewhere. This institution is not a pre-
cise model for a viable grass-roots economic development program for
depressed areas, both because loans are often made for day-to-day liv-
ing expenses rather than for capital improvement, and because the
credit union would not be an economically viable entity without
transfer payments from a major commercial bank that withdrew from
the neighborhood several years ago.210 The basic model of a grass-
roots organization in which members of the community pool their
savings and make loans to one another remains attractive, however.
Professor Edward Rubin has proposed an interesting version of
"lifeline" banking for low-income citizens under which grocery stores
and other retailers would be authorized to offer deposit services to
customers.211 This proposal offers a mix of deregulation and
increased competition tied to enhanced benefits for low-income con-
sumers, although there appears to be no reason why retailers could
not perform payment services for persons of average or even substan-
tial means as well. Although Rubin concludes that lifeline transac-
tion accounts would need to be insured by the federal government,212
this does not seem to be an essential part of the proposal; the funds
held on account could easily be backed by collateral, and the expan-
sion of federal deposit insurance hardly seems like a sensible idea
given the catastrophes that have occurred recently to the existing fed-
eral deposit insurance systems. The general idea of authorizing gro-
209 See Bill Atkinson, Institution Filling a Void on NY's Lower East Side, Am. Banker,
Nov. 13, 1990, at 8. The People's Federal Credit Union is one of more than 300 "lower-
income" credit unions that serve people in areas in which it has historically been difficult to
obtain credit. Id.
210 Id.
211 Edward L. Rubin, The Lifeline Banking Controversy: Putting Deregulation to Work for
the Low-Income Consumer, 67 Ind. L.J. 213, 234, 247 (1992).
212 Id. at 235, 247.
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cery stores and other retailers to perform payments functions,
however, appears to hold promise as a means of bringing basic bank-
ing services to low-income consumers through market mechanisms as
opposed to unwieldy, expensive, and inefficient government programs.
This is just a sampling of the creative ideas that have been advanced
to deal with the problem of providing financial services to areas
blighted by urban decay. Although none is a panacea, the problems
of the inner cities are not ones for which panaceas are to be expected.
If the imagination of policymakers can be directed toward new solu-
tions, and away from costly programs such as the CRA, the result
might be the development of innovative, market-driven initiatives that
better serve the national welfare as well as the interests of residents of
deteriorating urban neighborhoods.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we emphasize what we said at the outset: We have
no quarrel with, and in fact applaud, the goals of the CRA. The eco-
nomic revitalization of America's inner cities is in everyone's enlight-
ened interest. Nor do we question the motives or good faith of groups
that benefit from the statute. Many socially conscious and altruistic
people have utilized the statute to advance what they reasonably
believe to be worthwhile causes.
Further, we recognize that the CRA has benefited some people in
inner-city neighborhoods, as well as some small businesspeople, small
farmers, and the like. Depository institutions, especially the larger
institutions that have the most reason to fear CRA challenges, have
unquestionably attempted to increase the supply of credit to these and
other groups in order to receive CRA credit. And the CRA has no
doubt contributed to the empowerment of community groups, as well
as to individuals and offices within depository institutions and their
federal regulators, which are rightly sensitive to the problems facing
low-income communities today.
Our argument against the CRA is not that it has no good effects,
but that, on balance, the bad effects outweigh the good. Based on an
outdated ideology of community reinvestment, this statute allocates
credit inefficiently, impairs the safety and soundness of depository
institutions, imposes significant (and steadily increasing) compliance
costs, selectively taxes depository institutions over competing firms,
and, most tragically, harms the very group-residents of low-income
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urban areas-that it was ostensibly designed to serve. Politically pop-
ular though it is, the CRA should be comprehensively re-examined by
persons who are truly concerned about improving the plight of our
nation's inner cities.
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